973.64 
D74s 
c.  2 


Stephen  A.  Douglas. 

Speech  of  Hon.  "  "  on  the 
"Measures  of  Adjustment, " 

in  City  Hall,  Chicago, 

Oct.  23,  1850. 


LINCOLN 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 

presented  by 

C.  E.  Fahnestock  pams 


SPEECH 


, 


OF 


HON.  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS. 


ON    THE 


"MEASURES  OF  ADJUSTMENT/' 


DELIVERED  IN   THE   CITtf    HALL,   CHICAGO,    OCTOCER   23,.  1860. 


WASHINGTON: 
GIDEON  &  CO.,  PRINTERS, 
1851.     '  . 


PREFACE. 


The  following  speech  was  made  under  peculiar  circumstances.  The  two  Senators  from 
Illinois  had  sustained  all  the  measures  of  adjustment.  Upon  his  return  home,  Mr.  Douglai 
found  that  the  provisions  of  the  Fugitive  bill  had  been  so  grossly  misrepresented,  that 
public  opinion  was  loud  and  fierce  in  its  condemnation.  The  common  council  of  the 
city  of  Chicago,  in  their  official  capacity,  passed  resolutions  denouncing  the  law  as  a  violation 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  higher  law  of  GOD,  and  those  Senators  and 
Representatives  who  voted  for  it,  and  also  those  who  were  absent  and  consequently  did  not  vote 
against  it,  as  traitors,  Benedict  Arnolds,  and  Judas  Iscariots.  The  council  also  released  the 
"citizens,  officers,  and  police  of  the  city"  from  all  obligation  to  assist  or  participate  in  the  execu- 
tion of  the  law,  and  declared  that  "it  ought  not  to  be  respected  by  any  intelligent  community." 
On  the  next  night,  a  mass  meeting  of  the  citizens  was  held  for  the  purpose  of  approving  and' 
sanctioning  the  action  of  the  common  council,  and  organizing  violent  and  successful  resistance 
to  the  execution  of  the  law.  A  committee  reported  to  this  meeting  a  series  of  resolutions  more 
revolutionary  in  their  character,  and  going  to  a  greater  extent  in  resisting  the  authority  of  the 
Federal  Government,  than  even  those  of  the  common  council.  Numerous  speeches,  in  support 
of  the  resolutions,  were  received  with  boisterous  and  furious  applause,  pledging  their  authors  to 
resist  even  unto  the  dungeon  and  the  grave.  At  length  Mr.  Douglas,  being  the  only  member 
of  the  Illinois  delegation  then  in  the  city,  appeared  upon  the  stand,  and  stated,  that  in  consequence 
of  the  action  of  the  common  council  and  the  phrenzied  excitement  which  seemed  to  rage  all 
around  him,  he  desired  to  be  heard  before  the  assembled  people  of  the  city  in  vindication  of  all 
the  measures  of  adjustment,  and  especially  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  law.  He  said  he  would  not 
make  a  speech  that  night,  because  the  call  for  the  meeting  was  not  sufficiently  broad  to  autho- 
rize a  speech  in  defence  of  those  measures;  but  he  would  avail  himself  of  that  opportunity  to  give 
notice  that  on  the  next  night  he  would  address  the  people  of  Chicago  upon  these  subjects.  He 
invited  men  of  all  parties  and  shades  of  opinion  to  attend  and  participate  in  the  proceedings,  and 
assured  them  that  he  would  answer  every  objection  made,  and  every  question  which  should  be 
propounded,  touching  the  measures  of  adjustment,  and  especially  the  Fugitive  bill.  After  fur- 
ther discussion,  and  much  confusion^and  opposition,  the  meeting  was  induced  to  adjourn,  and 
hear  Mr.  Douglas's  defence  before  they  would  condemn  him.  In  the  mean  time,  the  excitement 
continued  to  increase,  and  the  next  night  (Oct.  23d)  a  tremendous  concourse  of  people  assembled 
— by  far  the  largest  meeting  ever  held  in  the  city — and  Mr.  Douglas  delivered  a  speech,  of  which 
the  following  is  a  fair  and  tolerably  good  report,  so  far  as  to  embrace  the  argument,  omitting 
necessarily  numerous  incidents  which  could  not  be  preserved  by  the  reporter.  The  meeting 
then  resolved  unanimously  to  faithf"lly  carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  law, 
and  to  perform  every  other  duty  and  obligation  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
The  meeting  also  adopted,  with  only  eight  or  ten  dissenting  voices,  a  resolution  repudiating  the 
action  of  the  common  council,  and  then  adjourned  with  nine  cheers — three  for  Douglas,  three  for 
the  Constitution,  and  three  for  our  glorious  Union.  On  the  next  night,  the  common  council  of 
the  city  of  Chicago  again  assembled,  and  repealed  their  nullifying  resolutions  by  a  vote  of  12  to  1. 


SPEECH. 


MR.  DOUGLAS,  said: 

The  agitation  on  the  subject  of  Slavery  now  raging  through  the  breadth  of 
the  land  presents  a  most  extraordinary  spectacle.  Congress,  after  a  protracted 
session  of  nearly  ten  months,  succeeded  in  passing  a  system  of  measures, 
which  are  believed  to  be  just  to  all  parts  of  the  Republic,  and  ought  to  be 
satisfactory  to  the  people.  The  South  has  not  triumphed  over  the  North,  nor 
has  the  North  achieved  a  victory  over  the  South.  Neither  party  has  made 
any  humiliating  concessions  to  the  other.  Each  has  preserved  its  honor, 
while  neither  has  surrendered  an  important  right,  or  sacrificed  any  substantial 
interest.  The  measures  composing  the  scheme  of  adjustment  are  believed  to 
be  in  harmony  with  the  principles  of  justice  and  the  Constitution. 

And  yet  we  find  that  the  agitation  is  re-opened  in  the  two  extremes  of  the 
Union  with  renewed  vigor  and  increased  violence.  In  some  of  the  Southern 
States,  special  sessions  of  the  Legislatures  are  being  called  for  the  purpose  of 
organizing  systematic  and  efficient  measures  of  resistance  to  the  execution  of 
the  laws  of  the  land,  and  for  the  adoption  of  Disunion  as  the  remedy.  In  the 
Northern  States,1  municipal  corporations,  and  other  organized  bodies  of  men, 
are  nullifying  the  acts  of  Congress,  and  raising  the  standard  of  rebellion 
against  the  authority  of  the  Federal  Government. 

At  the  South,  the  measures  of  adjustment  are  denounced  as  a  disgraceful 
s  ;rrerider  of  Southern  rights  to  Northern  abolitionism. 

At  the  North,  the  same  measures  are  denounced  with  equal  violence  as  a 
total  abandonment  of  the  rights  of  freemen  to  conciliate  the  slave  power. 

The  Southern  disunionists  repudiate  the  authority  of  the  highest  judicial 
tribunal  on  earth,  upon  the  ground  that  it  is  a  pliant  and  corrupt  instrument. in 
the  hands  of  Northern  fanaticism. 

The  Northern  nullifiers  refuse  to  submit  the  points  at  issue  to  the  same 
exalted  tribunal,  upon  the  ground  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
is  a  corrupt  and  supple  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  Southern  slave-ocracy. 

Fo.r  these  contradictory  reasons  the  people  in  both  sections  of  the  Union  are 
called  upon  to  resist  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  the  authority  of  the  Federal 
Government,  by  violence,  even  unto  death  and  disunion. 

Strange  and  contradictory  positions! 

Both  cannot  be  true,  and  I  trust  in  God  neither  may  prove  to  be.  We  have 
fallen  on  evil  times,  when  passion,  and  prejudice,  and  ambition,  can  so  blind 
the  judgments  and  deaden  the  consciences  of  men,  that  the  truth  cannot  be 


seen  and  felt.  The  people  of  the  North,  or  the  South,  or  both,  are  acting 
under  a  fatal  delusion.  Should  we  not  pause,  and  reflect,  and  consider,  whe- 
ther we,  as  well  as  they,  have  not  been  egregiously  deceived  upon  this  subject? 
It  is  my  purpose  this  evening  to  give  a  candid  and  impartial  exposition  of  these 
measures,  to  the  end  that  the  truth  may  be  known.  It  does  not  become  a  free 
people  to  rush  madly  and  blindly  into  violence,  and  bloodshed,  and  death,  and 
disunion,  without  first  satisfying  our  consciences  upon  whose  souls  the  guilty 
consequences  must  rest. 

The  measures,  known  as  the  Adjustment  or  Compromise  scheme,  are  six  in 
number : 

1.  The  admission  of  California,  with  her  free  constitution. 

' 

2.  The  creation  of  a  Territorial  government  for  Utah,  leaving  the  people  to 
regulate  their  own  domestic  institutions.  . 

3.  The  creation  of  a  Territorial  government  for  New  Mexico,  with  like  pro- 
visions. 

4.  The  adjustment  of  the  disputed  boundary  with  Texas. 

5.  The  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 

6.  The  Fugitive  Slave  bill. 

The  first  three  of  these  measures — California,  Utah,  and  New  Mexico— I 
prepared  with  my  own  hands,  and  reported  from  the  Committee  on  Territories, 
as  its  chairman,  in  the  precise  shape  in  which  they  now  stand  on  the  statute 
book,  with  one  or  two  unimportant  amendments,  for  which  1  also  voted.  I, 
therefore,  hold  myself  responsible  to  you,  as  my  constituents,  for  those  mea- 
sures as  they  passed.  If  there  is  anything  wrong  in  them,  hold  me  account- 
able; if  .there  is  anything  of  merit,  give  the  credit  to  those  who  passed  the 


bills.  These  measures  are  predicated  on  the  great  fundamental  principle  that 
every  people  ought  to  possess  the  right  of  forming  and  regulating  their  own 
internal  concerns  and  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way.  It  was  supposed 
that  those  of  our  fellow  citizens  who  emigrated  to  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  and 
to  our  other  territories,  were  as  capable  of  self-government  as  their  neighbors 
and  kindred  whom  they  left  behind  them;  and  there  was  no  reason  for  believ- 
ing that  they  have  lost  any  of  their  intelligence  or  patriotism  by  the  wayside, 
while  crossing  the  Isthmus  or  the  Plains.  It  was  also  believed,  that  after  their 
arrival  in  the  country,  when  they  had  become  familiar  with  its  topography, 
climate,  productions,  and  resources,  and  had  connected  their  destiny  with  it, 
they  were  fully  as  competent  to  judge  for  themselves  what  kind  of  laws  and 
institutions  were  best  adapted  to  their  condition  and  interests,  as  we  were  who 
never  saw  the  country,  and  knew  very  little  about  it.  To  question  their  compe- 
tency to  do  this,  was  to  deny  their  capacity  for  self-government.  If  they  have 
the  requisite  intelligence  and  honesty  to  be  intrusted  with  the  enactment  of 
laws  for  the  government  of  white  men,  I  know  of  no  reason  why  they  should 
not  be  deemed  competent  to  legislate  for  the  negro.  If  the}'  are  sufficiently 


enlightened  to  make  laws  for  the  protection  of  life,  liberty,  and  property— ^-ol 
morals  and  education — to  determine  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  of 
parent  and  child — I  am  not  aware  that  it  requires  any  higher  degree  of  civili- 
zation to  regulate  the  affairs  of  master  and  servant.  These  things  are  all  con- 
fided by  the  Constitution  to  each  State  to  decide  for  itself,  and  I  know  of  no 
reason  why  the  same  principle  should  not  be  extended  to  the  Territories.  My 
votes  and  acts  have  beea  in  accordance  with  these  views  in  all  cases,  except 
the  instances  in  which  I  voted  under  your  instructions.  Those  were  your 
votes,  and  not  mine.  I  entered  my  protest  against  them  at  the  time — before 
and  after  they  were  recorded — and  shall  never  hold  myself  responsible  for 
them.  I  believed  then,  and  believe  now,  that  it  was  better  for  the  cause  of 
freedom,  of  humanity,  and  of  republicanism,  to  leave  the  people  interested  to 
settle  all  these  questions  for  themselves.  They  have  intellect  and  consciences 
as  well  as  we,  and  have  more  interest  in  doing  that  which  is  best  for  them- 
selves and  their  posterity,  than  we  have  as  their  self-constituted  and  officious 
guardians.  I  deem  it  fortunate  for  the  peace  and  harmony  of  the  country 
that  Congress,  taking  the  same  view  of  the  subject,  rejected  the  Proviso,  and 
passed  the  bills  in  the  shape  in  which  I  originally  reported  them.  So  far  as 
slavery  is  concerned,  I  am  sure  that  any  man  who  will  take  the  pains  to 
examine  the  history  of  the  question,  will  come  to  the  conclusion  that  this  is 
the  true  policy,  as  well  as  the  sound  republican  doctrine.  ,  Mr.  DOUGLAS 
here  went  into  a  historical  view  of  the  subject,  to  show  that  Slavery  had 
never  been  excluded  in  fact  from  one  inch  of  the  American  Continent  by  act 
of  Congress.  When  the  Federal  Constitution  was  formed  in  '87,  twelve  of 
the  thirteen  States,  then  composing  the  Confederation,  held  slaves,  and  sus- 
tained the  institution  of  slavery  by  their  laws.  Since  that  period  slavery  had 
been  abolished  in  six  of  these  twelve  original  slave  States.  How  was  this 
effected?  Not  by  an  act  of  Congress.  Not  by  the  interposition  of  the  Federal 
Government.  Congress  had  no  power  over  the  subject,  and  never  attempted 
to  interfere  with  it.  Slavery  was  abolished  in  those  States  by  the  people  of 
each,  acting  for  themselves,  and  upon  their  own  motion  and  responsibility. 
The  people  became  convinced  that  it  was  for  their  own  interests,  and  the 
interests  of  their  posterity,  pecuniarily  and  morally,  and  they  did  it  of  their 
own  free  will,  and  rigidly  enforced  their  own  laws. 

So  it  was  in  the  territory  northwest  of  the  Ohio  river.  By  the  act  of  Congress, 
known  as  the  Ordinance  of  '87,  slavery  was  prohibited  by  LAW,  but  not  exclud- 
ed in  fact.  Slavery  existed  in  the  Territories  of  Illinois  and  Indiana,  in  spite 
of  the  ordinance,  under  the  authority  of  the  territorial  laws.  Illinois  was  a 
slaveholding  Territory  in  defiance  of  the  act  of  Congress,  but  became  a  free 
State  by  the  action  of  our  own  people,  when  they  framed  our  State  constitution, 
preparatory  to  their  admission  into  the  Union.  So  it  was  with  Indiana.  Ore- 
gon prohibited  slavery  by  the  action  of  her  people  under  their  provisional  govern- 


8 

ment,  several  years  before  Congress  established  a  territorial  government.  In 
short,  wherever  slavery  has  been  excluded,  and  free  institutions  established,  it 
has  been  done  by  the  voluntary  action  of  the  people  interested.  Wherever 
Congress  attempted  to  interfere  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  people  of  the 
territory,  its  enactments  remained  a  dead  letter  upon  the  statute  book,  and  the 
people  took  such  legislative  action  as  comported  with  their  inclinations  and  sup- 
posed interacts. 

Mr.  DOUGLAS  then  referred  to  the  country  acquired  from  Mexico,  and  called 
the  attention  of  the  audience  to  the  fact  that  the  abolitionists  had  all  predicted 
that  slavery  would  certainly  be  introduced  into  those  territories,  unless  Congress 
interfered  and  prohibited  it  by  law,  and  condemned  him  because  he  was  oppos- 
ed to  such  interference.  The  problem  is  now  solved.  What  was  then  a  matter 
of  opinion  and  disputation,  has  become  an  historical  fact.  Time  has  settled  the 
controversy,  and  shown  who  was  right  and  who  was  wrong.  The  Wilmot  Proviso 
was  not  adopted.  Congress  did  not  prohibit  slavery  in  those  territories,  and  yei 
slavery  does  not  exist  in  them.  In  California,  it  was  prohibited  by  the  people 
in  the  constitution  with  which  that  State  was  admitted  into  the  Union.  It  is 
well  known  that  the  people  of  New  Mexico,  when  they  formed  a  constitution 
with  the  view  of  asking  admission,  also  prohibited  slavery.  These  facts  show 
conclusively  that  all  the  predictions  of  the  abolitionists  upon  this  subject  have 
been  falsified  by  history,  and  that  my  own  have  been  literally  fulfilled.  I  refer  to 
these  facts,  not  in  the  spirit  of  self-gratulation,  but-to  show  that  these  men,  who 
have  alarmed  the  friends  of  freedom,  and  for  a  time  partially  controlled  the 
popular  sentiment,  were  themselves  mistaken,  and  misled  their  followers;  at  the 
same  time  that  their  doctrine  was  at  war  with  the  whole  spirit  of  our  republi- 
can institutions. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  measures  immediately  tinder  discussion.  It  must  be 
conceded  that  the  question  of  the  admission  of  California  was  not  free  from  dif- 
ficulty, independent  of  the  subject  of  slavery.  There  were  many  irregularities 
in  the  proceedings;  in  fact,  every  step  in  her  application  for  admission  was 
irregular,  when  viewed  with  reference  to  a  literal  compliance  with  the  most 
approved  rules  and  usages  in  the  admission  of  new  States.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  resulted  from  the  necessity  of  the  case. 
Congress  had  failed  to  perform  its  duty — had  established  no  territorial  govern- 
ment, and  made  no  provision  for  her  admission  into  the  Union.  She  was  left 
without  government,  and  was  therefore  compelled  to  provide  one  for  herself.  She 
could  not  conform  to  rules  which  had  not  been  established,  nor  comply  with 
laws  which  Congress  had  failed  to  enact.  The  same  irregularities  had  occurred, 
however,  and  been  waived,  in  the  admission  of  other  States  under  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances. True,  they  had  not  all  occurred  in  the  case  of  anyone  State;  but 
some  had  in  one,  others  in  another;  so  that,  by  looking  into  the  circumstances 
attending  the  admission  of  each  of  the  new  States,  we  find  that  all  of  these 


irregularities,  as  they  are  called,  had  intervened  and  been  waived  in  the  course 
of  our  legislative  history.     Besides,  the  territory  of  California  was  too  exten- 
sive for  one  State,  (if  we  are  to  adopt  the  old  States  as  a  guide  in  carving  out 
new  ones,)  being  about  three  times  the  size  of  New  York;  and  her  boundaries 
were  unnatural  and  unreasonable,  disregarding  the  topography  of  the  country, 
and  embracing  the  whole  mining  region  and  her  coast  in  the  limits.     Thus  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  slavery  question  was  not  the  only  real  difficulty  that  the 
admission  of  California  presented  to  the  minds  of  calm  and  reflecting  men; 
although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  it  was  the  exciting  cause,  which  stimulated 
a  large  portion  of  the  people  in  one  section  to  demand  her  instant  admission, 
and  in  the  other,  to  insist  upon  her  unconditional  rejection.     Even  in  this  point 
of  view,  I  humbly  conceive  that  the  ultras  in  each  extreme  of  the  Republic 
acted  under  a  misconception  of  their  true  interests  and  real  policy.    The  whole 
of  California — from  the  v  ery  nature  of  the  country,  her  rocks  and  sands,  elevation 
above  the  sea,  climate,  soil,  and  productions — was  bound  to  be  free  territory 
by  the  decision  of  her  own  people,  no  matter  when  admitted  or  how  divided. 
Hence,  if  considered  with  reference  to  the  preponderance  of  political  power 
between  the  free  and  slavehoiding  States,  it  was  manifestly  the  true  policy  of 
the  South  to  include  the  whole  country  in  one  State;  while  the  same  reasons 
should  have  induced  the  North  to  subdivide  it  into  as  many  States  as.  the  extent 
of  the  territory  would  justify.     But,  in  my  opinion,  it  was  not  proper  for  Con- 
gress to  act  upon  any  such  principle.     We  should  know  no  North,  no  South, 
in  our  legislation;  but  lock  to  the  interests  of  the  whole  country.     By  our  action 
in  this  case,  the  rights  and  privileges  of  California  and  the  Pacific  coast  were 
principally  to  be  affected.     By  erecting  the  country  into  one  State  instead  of 
three,  the  people  are  to  be  represented  in  the  Senate  by  two  in  the  place  of  six 
Senators.     If  their  interests  suffer  in  consequence,  they  can  blame  no  one  but 
themselves;  for  Congress  only  confirmed  what  they  had  previously  done.    The 
problem  in  relation  to  slavery  should  have  been  much  more  easily  solved.     It 
was  a  question  which  concerned  the  people  of  California  alone.     The  other 
States  of  the  Union  had  no  interest  in  it,  and  no  right  to  interfere  with  it.   South 
Carolina  settled  that  question  within  her  own  limits  to  suit  herself;  Illinois  has 
decided  it  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to  her  own  people;  and  upon  what  principle 
are  we  to  deprive  the  people  of  the  State  of  California  of  a  right  which  is  com- 
mon to  every  State  in  the  Union  ? 

^Fhe  bills  establishing  territorial  governments  for  Utah  and  New  Mexico  are 
silent  upon  the  subject  of  slavery;  except  the  provision  that,  when  they  should 
be  admitted  into  the  Union  as  States,  each  should  decide  the  question  of  slavery 
for  itself.  This  latter  provision  was  not  incorporated  in  my  original  bills,  for 
the  reason  that  I  conceived  it  to  involve  a  principle  so  clearly  deducible  from 
the  Constitution  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  embody  it  in  the  form  of  legal 
enactment.  But  when  it  was  offered  as  an  amendment  to  the  bills,  I  cheer- 


;4  10 

fully  voted  for  it,  lest  its  rejection  should  be  deemed  a  denial  of  the  principle 
asserted  in  it.  The  abolitionists  of  the  North  profess  to  regard  these  bills  as 
a  total  abandonment  of  the  principles  of  freedom,  because  they  do  not  contain 
an  express  prohibition  of  slavery;  while  the  ultras  of  the  South  denounce  the 
same  measures  as  equivalent  to  the  Wilmot  Proviso. 

Of  the  Texas  boundary  I  have  but  little  to  say,  for  the  reason  that  I  have 
scarcely  heard  it  alluded  to  since  my  return  home,  although  many  complaints 
are  made  against  it  in  other  portions  of  the  free  States.  It  was  an  unfortunate 
dispute,  which  could  result  in  no  practical  benefit  to  either  party,  no  matter 
how  decided.  The  territory  in  controversy  was  of  no  considerable  value.  If 
there  was  a  spot  upon  the  face  of  the  American  continent  more  worthless 
than  any  other;  if  there  was  a  barren  waste  more  desolate — sands  more  arid, 
and  rocks  more  naked  than  all  others — it  was  the  country  in  di?pute  between 
Texas  and  the  United  States.  Distant  from  navigation,  and  almost  inaccessible 
for  want  of  means  of  communication;  void  of  timber,  fuel,  water  or  soil,  with 
the  exception  of  here  and  there  a  nook  in  the  gorges  of  the  mountains;  it  was 
entirely  useless,  save  as  it  afforded  hiding  places  for  the  wild  and  roaming  savages. 
And  yet  the  controversy  was  none  the  less  serious  and  fierce  in  consequence 
of  the  barrenness  of  the  country.  Texas  believed  it  to  be  hers,  and  deemed 
it  a  point  of  honor  to  maintain  her  title  at  all  hazards  and  against  all  odds. 
Many  of  the  States  entertained  doubts  of  the  validity  of  the  Texan  claim,  while 
others  considered  it  entirely  without  foundation.  In  this  state  of  the  case, 
each  party  having  partial  possession,  was  mustering  troops  to  render  its  pos- 
session complete  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other.  Many  of  the  slaveholding 
States,  from  sympathy  with  the  peculiar  institutions  of  Texas,  were  preparing 
to  array  themselves  on  the  one  side;-while  most  of  the  free  States,  from  aver- 
sion to  those  institutions,  were  expected  to  array  themselves  on  the  other. 
Thus  were  we  plunging  headlong  and  madly  into  a  civil  war,  involving  results 
which  no  human  wisdom  could  foresee,  and  consequences  which  could  be  con- 
templated only  with  horror. 

Fortunately  this  unnatural  struggle  was  averted  by  the  timely  and  judicious 
interposition  of  Congress.  The  Committee  on  Territories,  to  whom  the  subject 
had  been  referred,  found  it  impossible  to  ascertain  and  agree  upon  the  true 
boundary  line  of  Texas,  and  accordingly  authorized  me,  as  their  chairman,  to 
report  a  bill  for  adjusting  the  boundary  upon  an  arbitrary  but  convenient  line, 

drawn  through  the  centre  of  the  Desert,  and  to  pay  Texas dollars 

for  relinquishing  her  claim  to  the  waste  lands  outside  of  that  line.  I,  there- 
fore, reported  this  provision,  at  the  same  time  that  I  brought  in  the  .bills  for 
California,  Utah,  and  New  Mexico,  with  the  intention  of  moving  to  fill  the 
blank  with  ten  millions  of  dollars.  When  the  Committee  of  Thirteen,  which 
was  subsequently  appointed,  united  into  one  the  several  bills  which  had  been  re- 
ported by  the  Committee  on  Territories,  and  thus  formed  what  has  been  known 


11  I* 

as  the  "  Omnibus  Bill,"  they  made  a  slight  change  in  the  line  which  had  been 
agreed  upon  by  the  Territorial  committee.  Upon  the  defeat  of  the  Omnibus, 
Mr.  PIERCE,  of  Maryland,  brought  in  a  separate  bill  for  adjusting  this  boundary, 
predicated  upon  the  principle,  also,  of  an  arbitrary  but  convenient  line  through 
the  Desert,  changing  the  courses,  however,  so  as  to  obviate  some  objections 
which  have  been  urged  to  the  others,  and  paying  Texas  ten  millions  of  dol- 
lars for  relinquishing  her  claim.  This  bill,  after  having  been  joined  in  the 
House,  of  Representatives  to  the  bill  establishing  a  Territorial  government  for 
New  Mexico,  passed  both  Houses,  and  became  the  law  of  the  land.  The  peo- 
ple of  Texas  have  since  ratified  it  at  the  polls  by  an  overwhelming  majority; 
and  thus  this  dangerous  element  of  agitation  has  been  withdrawn  from  the  con- 
troversy by  the  mutual  assent  of  the  parties.  And  yet  there  are  organized 
parties,  in  both  extremes  of  the  Union,  who  are  striving  to  re-open  the  contro- 
versy by  persuading  the  people  that  the  rights  and  interests  of  their  own  par- 
ticular section  have  been  basely  betrayed  in  the  settlement  of  this  question. 
At  the  South,  it  is  boldly  proclaimed,  and  every  where  repeated,  that  sixty  thou- 
sand square  miles  of  slave-territory  have  been  sold  and  converted  into  free-soil. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Northern  nullifiers  and  Abolitionists  are  industriously 
impressing  it  upon  the  people  that  more  than  fifty  thousand  square  miles  of  free- 
soil  have  been  transferred  to  Texas,  and  converted  into  slave-territory  by  the 
act  of  Congress  adjusting  the  Texas  boundary.  Such  are  the  extremities  to 
which  prejudice  and  ambition  can  lead  desperate  men  !  Neither  party  has 
gained  or  lost  any  thing,  so  far  as  the  question  of  slavery  is  concerned.  Texas 
has  gained  ten  millions  of  dollars,  and  the  United  States  have  saved,  in  blood 
and  treasure,  the  expense*  of  a  civil  war. 

The  next  in  the  series  of  measures  was  the  bill  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave 
trade  in  the  district  of  Columbia.  This  bill  was  prepared  and  reported  by  the 
Committee  of  Thirteen,  and  I  gave  it  my  cordial  support.  It  has  been  repre- 
sented at  the  South  as  a  concession  to  the  North,  to  induce  us  to  perform  our 
duties  under  the  Constitution  in  the  surrender  of  fugitives  from  labor,  and 
much  opposition  has  been  raised  against  the  whole  scheme  of  adjustment  on 
that  account.  I  did  not  regard  it  in  that  light.  My  vote  was  given  upon  no 
such  considerations.  I  believed  each  of  the  measures  substantially  right  in 
itself,  and.  under  the  extraordinary  circumstances  by  which  we  were  sur- 
rounded, eminently  wise  and  expedient.  The  bill  does  not  abolish  slavery  in 
the  district— does  not  emancipate  the  few  slaves  that  are  there,  and  interferes 
with  no  man's  right  of  property.  It  simply  provides  that  slaves  shall  not  be 
brought  from  the  surrounding  States,  or  elsewhere,  into  the  district  for  sale.  In 
this  respect,  Congress  only  followed  the  example  of  the  legislatures  of  Mary- 
land, North  Carolina,  Kentucky,  and,  in  fact,  most  of  the  slaveholding  States. 
The  country  embraced  within  the  limits  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  therefore, 
.stands  in  precisely  the  same  relation  to  the  slave  trade  under  this  law,  that  it 


>  12 

would  have  stood  under  the  laws  of  Maryland,  if  it  had  never  been  sep- 
arated from  that  State.  What  justification  can  there  be,  then,  for  the  assertion 
that  this  was  a  concession  to  the  North?  It  does  nothing  more  nor  less  than  to 
apply  the  general  principles  of  the  legislation  of  a  majority  of  the  Southern 
States  to  the  District  of  Columbia.  But,  while  it  was  no  concession  from  one 
section  to  the  other,  I  had  a  right  to  expect  that  those  modern  philanthropists 
who  have  declaimed  so  eloquently  and  violently  against  the  disgrace  of  the  Na- 
tional Capitol,  by  the  slave  trade  within  its  precincts,  would  have  rejoiced  with 
exceeding  joy  at  the  passage  of  this  act.  I  have  listened  in  vain  for  one  word 
of  approval  or  commendation  from  the  advocates  of  abolition  and  nullification. 
While  the  whole  series  of  Compromise  measures  are  denounced  in  coarse  and 
unmeasured  terms,  not  one  word  of  congratulation  to  the  friends  of  freedom — 
not  a  woi-d  of  approval  of  the  act  or  of  the  conduct  of  those  who  voted  for  it — is 
allowed  to  escape  their  lips.  All  the  other  measures  of  the  scheme  of  adjust- 
ment are  attempted  to  be  kept  in  the  background,  and  concealed. from  the  pub- 
lic view,  in  order  that  more  prominence  and  importance  may  be  given  fo  what 
they  are  pleased  to  call  "THE  INFAMOUS  FUGITIVE  SLAVE  BILL." 

Before  I  proceed  to  the  exposition  of  that  bill,  I  will  read  the  preamble  and 
resolutions  passed  by  the  common  council  of  this  city,  night  before  last. 

Mr.  Douglass  then  read  as  follows: 
' 

Whereas,  The  Constitution  of  the  United  atives  in  Congress  from  the  Free  States,  who 
States  provides  that  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  aided  and  assisted  in  the  passage  of  this  infa- 
Habeas  Corpus  shall  not  be  suspended,  unless  mous  kvy,  and  those  who  basely  sneaked  away 
when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  from  their  seats,  and  thereby  evaded  the  ques- 
public  safety  may  require  it;  and,  tion,  richly  merit  the  reproach  of  all  lovers  of 

Whereas,  The  late  act  of  Congress,  purport-  freedom,  and  .are  fit  only  to  be  ranked  with  the 
ing  to  be  for  the  recovery  of  fugitive  slaves,  traitors,  Benedict  Arnold  and  Judas  Iscariot, 
virtually  suspends  the  Habeas  Corpus  and  who  betrayed  his  Lord  and  Master  for  thirty 
abolishes  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  by  its  pieces  of  silver. 

provisions,  not  only  fugitive  slaves,  but  white  Jlnd  Resolved,  That  the  citizens,  officers,  and 
men,  "owing  service"  to  another  in  another  police  of  the  city  be,  and  they  are  hereby,  re- 
State,  viz.,  the  apprentice,  the  mechanic,' the  quested  to  abstain  from  any  and  all  interference 
farmer,  the  laborer  engaged  on  contract  or  oth-  in  the  capture  and  delivering  up  of  the  fugitive 
erwise,  whose  terms  of  service  are  unexpireJ,  from  unrighteous  oppression,  of  whatever  na- 
may  be  captured  and  carried  off  summarily,  tion,  name,  or  color, 
and  without  legal  resource  of  any  kind;  and,  Resolved,  That  the  fugitive  slave  law  lately 

Whereas,  No  law  can  be  legally  or  morally  passed  by  Congress  is  a  cruel  and  unjust  law, 
binding  on  us  which  violates  the  provisions  of  and  ought  not  to  be  respected  by  any  intelli- 
the  Constitution;  and,  gent  community,  and  that  thi ;  Council  will  not 

Whereas,  Above  all,  in  the  responsibilities    require  the  city  police  to  render  any  assistance 
of  human  life,  and  the  practice  and  propagation    for  the  arrest  of  fugitive  slaves. 
of  Christianity,  the  laws,  of  God  shoula  be  held       AYES — Aid.     Milliken,  .  Loyd,    Sherwood, 
paramount  to  all  human  compacts  and  statutes:  •  Foss,  Tbroop,  Sherman,  Richards,  Brady,  and 
Therefore,  Dodge. 

Resolved,  That  the  Senators  and  Represent-       NAYS — Aid.  Page  and  Williams. 

But  for  the  passage  of  these  resolutions,  said  Mr.  D.,  I  should  not  have  ad- 
dressed you  this  evening,  nor,  indeed,  at  any  time  before  my  return  to  the 
Capitol.  I  have  no  desire  to  conceal  or  withhold  my  opinions,  no  wish  to  avoid 
the  responsibility  of  a  full  and  frank  expression  of  them,  upon  this  and  all  other 
subjects  which  were  embraced  in  the  action  of  the  last  session  of  Congress. 


13 

v 

My  reasons  for  wishing  to  avoid  public  discussion  at  this  time,  were  to  be  found 
in  the  state  of  my  health  and  the  short  time  allowed  me  to  remain  among  you. 

Now  to  the  resolutions.  I  make  no  criticism  upon  the  language  in  which 
they  are  expressed;  that  is  a  matter  of  taste,  -and  in  every  thing  of  that  kind  I 
defer  to  the  superior  refinement  of  our  city  fathers.  But  it  cannot  be  disguised 
that  the  polite  epithets  of  "traitors,  Benedict  Arnold  and  Judas  Iscariot,  who 
betrayed  his  lord  and  master  for  thirty  pieces  of  silver,''  will  be  understood 
abroad  as  having  a  direct  personal  application  to  my  esteemed  colleague,  Gen. 
SHIELDS,  and  myself.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  intention  of  those  who  voted 
for  the  resolutions,  I  will  do  the  members  of  the  council  the  justice  to  say,, 
that  I  do  not  believe  they  intended  to  make  any  such  application.  But 
their  secret  intentions  are  of  little  consequence,  when  they  give  their  official 
sanction  to  a  charge  of  infamy,  clothed  in  such  language  that  every  man  who 
reads  it  must  give  it  a  personal  application.  The  whole  affair,  however,  looks 
strange,  and  even  ludicrous,  when  contrasted  with  the  cordial  reception  and 
public  demonstrations  of  kindness  and  confidence,  and  even  gratitude  for  sup- 
posed services,  extended  to  my  colleague  and  myself  upon  our  arrival  in  this 
city  one  week  ago.  Then  we  were  welcomed  home  as  public  benefactors,  and 
invited  to  partake  of  a  public  dinner,  by  an  invitation  numerously  signed  by 
men  of  all  parties  and  shades  of  opinion.  The  invitation  had  no  sooner  been 
declined,  for  reasons  which  were  supposed  to  be  entirely  satisfactory,  and  my 
colleague  started  for  his  home,  than  the  common  council,  who  are  presumed  to 
speak  officially  for  the  whole  population  of  the  city,  attempted  to  brand  their 
honored  guests  with  infamy,  and  denounce  them  as  Benedict  Arnolds  and  Ju- 
das Iscariots!  I  have  read  somewhere  that  it  was  a  polite  custom,  in  other 
countries  and  a  different  age,  to  invite  those  whom  they  secretly  wished  to 
destroy  to  a  feast,  in  order  to  secure  a  more  convenient  opportunity  of  admin- 
istering the  hemlock!  I  acquit  the  common  council  of  any  design  of  intro- 
ducing that  custom  into  our  hospitable  city.  But  I  have  done  with  this  sub- 
ject, so  far  as  it  has  a  personal  bearing. 

It  is  a  far  more  important  and  serious  matter,  when  viewed  with  reference 
to  the  principles  involved,  and  the  consequences  which  may  result.  The  com- 
mon council  of  the  city  of  Chicago  have  assumed  to  themselves  the  right, 
and  actually  exercised  the  power,  of  determining  the  validity  of  an  act  of  Con- 
gress, and  have  declared  it  void  upon  the  ground  that  it  violates  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  the  law  of  God!  They  have  gone  further;  they 
declared,  by  a  solemn  official  act,  that  a  law  passed  by  Congress  "ought  not 
to  be  respected  by  any  intelligent  community,"  and  have  called  upon  "the 
citizens,  officers,  and  police  of  the  city"  to  abstain  from  rendering  any  aid  or 
assistance  in  its  execution!  What  is  this  but  naked,  unmitigated  nullification 
An  act  of  the  American  Congress  nullified  by  the  common  council  of  the  city 
of  Chicago!  Whence  did  the  council  derive  their  authority?  I  have  been  able 


14 

to  find  no  such  provision  in  the  city  charter,  nor  ami  aware  that  the  legisla- 
ture of  Illinois  is  vested  with  any  rightful  power  to  confer  such  authority. 
I  have  yet  to  learn  that  a  subordinate  municipal  corporation  is  licensed  to  raise 
the  standard  of  rebellion,  and  throw  off  the  authority  of  the  Federal  Government, 
at  pleasure!  This  is  a  great  improvement  upon  South  Carolinian  nullification. 
It  dispenses  with  the  trouble,  delay,  and  expense  of  convening  legislatures  and 
assembling  conventions  of  the  people,  for  the  purpose  of  resolving  themselves 
back  into  their  original  elements,  preparatory  to  the  contemplated  revolution. 
It  has  the  high  merit  of  marching  directly  to  its  object,  and  by  a  simple  resolu- 
tion, written  and  adopted  on  the  same  night,  relieving  the  people  from  their 
oaths  and  allegiance,  and  of  putting  the  nation  and  its  laws  at  defiance!  It  has 
heretofore  been  supposed,  by  men  of  antiquated  notions,  who  have  not  kept  up 
with  the  progress  of  the  age,  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  was  in- 
vested with  the  power  of  determining  the  validity  of -an  act  of  Congress  pass- 
ed in  pursuance  of  the  forms  of  the  Constitution.  This  was  the  doctrine  of  the 
entire  North,  and  of  the  nation,  when  it  became  necessary,  to  exert  the  whole 
power  of  the  Government  to  put  down  nullification  in  another  portion  of  the 
Union.  But  the  spirit  of  the  age  is  progressive,  and  is  by  no  means  confined 
to  advancement  in  the  arts  and  physical  sciences.  The  science  of  politics  and 
of  government  is  also  rapidly  advancing  to  maturity  and  perfection.  It  is  not 
long  since  that  I  heard  an  eminent  lawyer  propose  an  important  reform  in  the 
admirable  judicial  system  of  our  State,  which,  he  thought,  would  render  it 
perfect.  It  was  so  simple  and  eminently  practicable,  that  it  could  not  fail  to 
excite  the  admiration  of  even  the  casual  inquirer.  His  proposition  was,  that 
our  judicial  system  should  be  so  improved  as  to  allow  an  appeal,  on  all  consti- 
tutional questions,  from  the  supreme  court  of  this  State  to  two  justices  of  the 
peace!  When  that  shall  have  been  effected,  but  one  other  reform  will  be  neces- 
sary to  render  our  national  system  perfect,  and  that  is,  to  change  the  federal 
Constitution,  so  as  to  authorize  an  appeal,  upon  all  questions  touching  the  va- 
lidity of  acts  of  Congress,  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  to  the 
common  council  of  the  city  of  Chicago! 

So  much  for  the  general  principles  involved  in  the  acts  of  the  council.  I 
will  now  examine  briefly  the  specific  grounds  of  objection  urged  by  the  council 
against  the  Fugitive  Slave  bill,  as  reasons  why  it  should  not  be  obeyed. 

The  objections  are  two  in  number  :  first,  that  it  suspends  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  in  time  of  peace,  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  ;  secondly,  that  it 
abolishes  the  right  of  trial  by  jury. 

How  the  council  obtained  the  information  that  these  two  odious  provisions 
were  contained  in  the  law,  I  am  unable  to  divine.  One  thing  is  certain,  that 
the  members  of  the  council,  who  voted  for  these  resolutions,  had  never  read  the 
law,  or  they  would  have  discovered  their  mistake.  There  is  not  one  word  in 
it  in  respect  to  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  or  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  Neither 


15  » 

of  these  subjects  is  mentioned  or  referred  to.  The  law  is  entirely  silent  on 
those  points.  Is  it  to  be  said  that  an  act  of  Congress,  which  is  silent  on  the 
subject,  ought  to  be  construed  to  repeal  a  great  constitutional  right  by  implica- 
tion ?  Besides,  this  act  is  only  an  amendment — amendatory  of  the  old  law — 
the  act  of  1793 — but  does  not  repeal  it.  There  is  no  difference  between  the 
original  act  and  the  amendment,  in  this  respect.  Both  are  silent  in  regard  to 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  and  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  If  to  be  silent  is  to 
suspend  the  one  and  abolish  the  other,  then  the  mischief  was  done  by  the  old 
law  fifty-seven  years  ago.  If  this  construction  be  correct,  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  has  been  suspended,  and  trial  by  jury  abolished,  more  than  half  a  century, 
without  anybody  ever  discovering  the  fact,  or,  if  knowing  it,  without  uttering 
a  murmur  of  complaint. 

Mr.  DOUGLAS  ,then  read  the  whole  of  the  act  of  1793,  and  compared  its  pro- 
visions with  the  amendment  of  last  session,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  and  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  were  not  alluded  to  or 
interfered  with  by  either.  But  I  maintain,  said  Mr.  D.,  that  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  is  applicable  to  the  case  of  the  arrest  of  a  fugitive  under  this 
law,  in  the  same  sense  in  which  the  Constitution  intended  to  confer  it,  and  to 
the  fullest  extent  for  which  that  writ  is  ever  rightfully  issued  in  any  case.  In 
this  I  am  fully  sustained  by  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Crittenden,  the  Attorney 
General  of  the  United  States.  As  soon  as  the  bill  passed  the  two  Houses  of 
Congress,  an  abolition  paper  raised  the  alarm  that  the  habeas  corpus  had  been 
suspended,  The -cry  was  eagerly  caught  up,  and  transmitted,  by  lightning, 
upon  the  wires,  to  every  part  of  the  Union,  by  those  whose  avocation  is  agita- 
tion. The  President  of  the  United  States,  previous  to  signing  the  bill,  referred 
it  to  the  Attorney  General,  for  his  opinion  upon  the  point  whether  any  portion 
of  it  violated  any  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  'United  States,  and 
especially  whether  it  could  possibly  be  construed  to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus.  I  have  the  answer  of  the  Attorney  General  before  me,  in  which  he 
gives  it  as  his  decided  opinion  that  every  part  of  the  law  is  entirely  consistent 
with  the  Constitution,  and  that  it  does  not  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 
I  would  commend  the  argument  of  the  Attorney  General  to  the  careful  perusal 
of  those  who  have  doubts  upon  the  subject.  Upon  the  presentation  of  this 
opinion,  and  with  entire  confidence  in  its  correctness,  President  Filmore  signed 
the  bill. 

[Here  Mr.  DOUGLAS  was  interrupted  by  a  person  present,  who  called  his 
attention  to  the  last  clause  of  the  6th  section  of  the  bill,  which  he  read,  and 
asked  him  what  construction  he  put  upon  it,  if  it  did  not  suspend  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus.] 

Mr.  Douglas,  in  reply,  expressed  his  thanks  to  the  gentleman  who  pro- 
pounded the  inquiry.  His  object  was  to  meet  every  point,  and  remove  every 
doubt  that  could  possibly  be  raised  ;  and  he  expressed  the  hope  that  every 


16 

gentleman  present  would  exercise  the  privilege  of  asking  him  questions  upon 
all  points  upon  which  he  was  not  fully  satisfied.  He  th.en  proceeded  to  answer 
the  question  which  had  been  propounded.  That  section  of  the  bill  provides 
for  the  arrest  of  the  fugitive  and  the  trial  before  the  commissioner ;  and,  if 
the  facts  of  servitude,  ownership,  and  escape  be  established  by  competent 
evidence,  the  commissioner  shall  grant  a  certificate  to  that  effect,  which  certi- 
ficate shall  be  conclusive  of  the  right  of  the  person  in  whose  favor  it  is  issued 
to  remove  the  fugitive  to  the  State  from  which  he  fled.  Then  comes  the 
clause  which  is  supposed  to  suspend  the  habeas  corpus:  "  And shall  prevent  all 
molestation  of  said  person  or  persons  by  any  process  issued  by  any  court ,  judge, 
magistrate,  or  other  person  whomsoever." 

The  question  is  asked,  whether  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  not  a  "  PROCESS  " 
within  the  meaning  of  this  act?  I  answer,  that  it  undoubtedly  is  such  a  "  pro- 
cess," and  that  it  may  be  issued  by  any  court  or  judge  having  competent 
authority — not  for  the  purpose  of  "molesting"  a  claimant,  having  a  servant 
in  his  possession,  with  such  a  certificate  from  the  commissioner  or  judge,  but 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  fact  whether  he  has  such  a  certificate  or 
not;  and  if  so,  whether  it  be  in  due  form  of  law;  and  if  not,  by  what  authority 
he  holds  the  servant  in  custody.  Upon  the  return  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus, 
the  claimant  will  be  required  to  exhibit  to  the  court  his  authority  for  conveying 
that  servant  back;  and  if  he  produces  a  "certificate"  from  the  commissioner 
or  judge,  in  due  form  of  law,  the  court  will  decide  that  it  has  no  power  to  "  molest 
the  claimant "  in  the  exercise  of  his  rights  under  the  law  and  the  Constitution. 
But  if  the  claimant  is  not  able  to  produce  such  certificate,  or  other  lawful 
authority,  or  produces  one  which  is  not  in  conformity  with  law,  the  court  will 
set  the  alleged  servant  at  liberty,  for  the  very  reason  that  the  law  has  not  been 
complied  with.  The  sole  object  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  to  ascertain 
by  what  authority  a  person  is  held  in  custody;  to  release  him,  if  no  such  au- 
thority be  shown;  and  to  refrain  from  any  molestation  of  the  claimant,  if  legal 
authority  be  produced.  The  habeas  corpus  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  carry 
the  Fugitive  law  into  effect,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  prevent  a  violation 
of  the  rights  of  freemen  under  it.  It  is  essential  to  the  security  of  the  claim- 
ant, as  well  as  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  those  liable  to  be  arrested  under 
it.  The  reason  that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  not  mentioned  in  the  bill 
must  be  obvious.  The  object  of  the  new  law  seems  to  have  been,  to  amend 
the  old  one  in  those  particulars  wherein  experience  had  proven  amendments  to 
be  necessary,  and  in  all  other  respects  to  leave  it  as  it  had  stood  from  the 
days  of  Washington.  The  provisions  of  the  old  law  have  been  subjected  to  the 
test  of  long  experience — to  the  scrutiny  of  the  bar  and  the  judgment  of  the 
courts.  The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  had  been  adjudged  to  exist  in  all  cases 
under  it,  and  had  always  been  resorted  to  when  a  proper  case  arose.  In 


17 

amending  the  law  there  was  no  necessity  for  an:  new  provision  upon  this  sub- 
ject, because  nobody  desired  to  change  it  in  this  respect. 

But  why  this  extraordinary  effort,  on  the  part  of  the  professed  friends  of  the 
fugitive,  to  force  such  a  construction  upon  the  law,  in  the  absence  of  any  such 
obnoxious  provision,  as  to  deprive  him  of  the  benefit  ol  the  writ  of  habeas  cor- 
pus? The  law  does  not  do  so  in  terms;  and  if  it  is  ever  accomplished,  it  must 
be  done  by  implication,  contrary  to  the  understanding  of  those  who  enacted  it, 
and  in  opposition  to  the  practice  of  the  courts,  acquiesced  in  by  the  people,  from 
the  foundation  of  ihe  government.  One  would  naturally  suppose,  that  if  there 
was  room  for  doubt  as  to  wh'at  is  the  true  construction,  those  who  claim  to  be 
the  especial  and  exclusive  friends  of  the  negro  would  contend  for  that  construc- 
tion which  is  most  favorable  to  liberty,  justice,  and  humanity.  But  not  so. 
Directly  the  reverse  is  the  fact.  They  exhaust  their  learning,  and  exert  all  their 
ingenuity  and  skill,  to  deprive  the  negro  of  all  rights  under  the  law.  What  can 
be  the  motive?  Certainly  not  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  free,  or  to  extend 
liberty  to  the  oppressed;  for  they  strive  to  fasten  upon  the  law  such  a  construc- 
tion as  would  defeat  both  of  these  ends.  Can  it  be  a  political  scheme,  to  ren- 
der the  law  odious,  and  to  excite  prejudice  against  all  who  voted  for  it,  or  were 
unavoidably  absent  when  it  passed  ?  No  matter  what  the  motive,  the  effect 
would  be  disastrous  to  those  whose  rights  they  profess  to  cherish,  if  their  efforts 
should  be  successful. 

Now,  a  word  or  two  in  regard  to  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  The  city  council, 
in  their  resolutions,  say  that  this  law  abolishes  that  right.  I  have  already  shown 
you  that  the  council  are  mistaken — that  the  law  is  silent  upon  the  subject,  and 
stands  now  precisely  as  it  has  stood  for  half  a  century.  If  the  law  is  defective 
on  that  point,  the  error  was  committed  by  our  fathers  in  1793,  and  the  people 
have  acquiesced  in  it  ever  since,  without  knowing  of  its  existence  or  caring  to 
remedy  it.  The  new  act  neither  takes  away  nor  confers  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury.  It  leaves  it  just  where  our  fathers  and  the  Constitution  left  it  under  the 
old  law.  That  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  exists  in  this  country  for  all  men,  black 
or  white,  bond  or  free,  guilty  or  innocent,  no  man  will  be  disposed  to  question 
who  understands  the  subject.  Th  "ight  is  of  universal  application,  and  exists 
alike  in  all  the  States  of  the  Union;  it  always  has  existed,  and  always  will  exist, 
so  long  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  shall  be  respected  and  main- 
tained, in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  abolitionists  to  take  it  away  b^  a  pervei.  ;on 
of  the  Fugitive  law.  The  only  question  is,  where  shall  this  jury  trial  take  place? 
Shall  the  jury  trial  be  had  in  the  State  where  the  arrest  is  made,  or  the  State 
from  which  the  fugitive  escaped  ?  Upon  this  point  the  act  of  last  session  says 
nothing,  and,  of  course,  leaves  the  matter  as  it  stood  under  the  law  of  '93. 
The  old  law  was  silent  on  this  point,  and  therefore  left  the  courts  to  decide  it 
in  accordance  with  the  Constitution.  The  highest  judicial  tribunals  in  the  land 
have  always  held  that  the  jury  trial  mx-  -t  take  place  in  the  State  under  whose 


18 


jurisdiction  the  question  arose,  and  whose  laws  were  alleged  to  have  been  vio- 
lated. The  same  construction  has  always  been  given  to  the  law  for  surrender- 
ing fugitives  from  justice.  It  provides  also  for  sending  back  the  fugitive,  but 
says  nothing  about  the  jury  trial,  or  where  it  shall  take  place.  Who  ever  sup- 
posed that  that  act  abolished  the  right  of  trial  by  jury?  Every  day's  practice 
and  observation  teach  us  otherwise.  The  jury  trial  is  always  had  in  the  State 
from  which  the  fugitive  fled.  So  it  is  with  a  fugitive  from  labor.  When  he 
returns,  or  is  surrendered  under  the  law,  he  is  entitled  to  a  trial  by  jury  of  his 
right  of  freedom,  and  always  has  it  when  he  demands  it.  There  is  great  uni- 
formity in  the  mode  of  proceeding  in  the  courts  of  the  southern  States  in  this 
respect.  When  the  supposed  slave  sets  up  his  claim,  to  the  judge  or  other  offi- 
cer, that  he  is  free,  and  claims  his  freedom,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
issue  its  summons  to  the  master  to  appear  in  court  with  the  alleged  slave,  and 
there  to  direct  an  issue  of  freedom  or  servitude  to  be  made  and  tried  by  a  jury. 
The  master  is  also  required  to  enter  into  bonds  for  his  own  appearance  and  that 
of  the  alleged  slave  at  the  trial  of  the  cause,  and  that  he  will  not  remove  the 
slave  from  the  county  or  jurisdiction  of  the  court  in  the  mean  time.  The  court 
is  also  required  to  appoint  counsel  to  conduct  the  cause  for  the  slave,  while  the 
master  employs  his  own  counsel.  All  the  officers  of  the  court  are  required  by 
law  to  render  all  facilities  to  the  slave  for  the  prosecution  of  his  suit  free  of 
charge,  such  as  issuing  and  serving  subpoenas  for  witnesses,  &c.  If  upon  the 
trial  the  alleged  slave  is  held  to  be  a  free  man,  the  master  is  required  to  pay  the 
costs  on  both  sides.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  held  to  be  a  slave,  the  State 
pays  the  costs.  This  is  the  way  in  which  the  trial  by  jury  stood  under  the  old 
law;  and  the  new  one  makes  no  change  in  this  respect.  If  the  act  of  last  ses- 
sion be  repealed,  that  will  neither  benefit  nor  injure  the  fugitive,  so  far  as  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury  is  concerned. 

For  these  two  reasons — the  habeas  corpus  and  the  trial  by  jury — the  common 
council  have  pronounced  the  law  unconstitutional,  and  declared  that  it  ought 
not  to  be  respected  by  an  enlightened  community.  I  have  shown  that  neither 
of  the  objections  are  well  founded,  and  that  if  they  had  taken  the  trouble  to 
read  the  law  before  they  nullified  it,  they  would  have  avoided  the  mistake  into 
which  they  have  fallen.  I  have  spoken  of  the  acts  of  the  city  council  in  gene- 
ral terms,  and  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  vote  was  unanimous.  I  take  pleasure 
in  stating  that  I  learn  from  the  published  proceedings  that  there  was  barely  a 
quorum  present,  and  that  Aldermen  Page  and  Williams  voted  in  the  negative. 

Having  disposed  of  the  two  reasons  assigned  by  the  common  council  for  the 
nullification  of  the  law,  I  shall  be  greatly  indebted  to  any  gentleman  who  will 
point  out  any  other  objection  to  the  new  law,  which  does  not  apply  with  equal 
force  to  the  old  one.  My  object  in  drawing  the  parallel  between  the  new  and 
old  law  is  this  :  The  law  of  '93  was  passed  by  the  patriot?  and  sages  who 
framed  our  glorious  Constitution,  and  approved  by  the  father  of  his  country. 


19 

I  have  always  been  taught  to  believe  that  they  were  men  well  versed  in  the 
science  of  government,  devotedly  attached  to  the  cause  of  freedom,  and  capa- 
ble of  construing  the  Constitution  in  the  spirit  in  which  they  made  it.  That 
act  has  been  enforced  and  acquiesced  in  for  more  than  half  a  century,  without 
a  murmur  or  word  of  complaint  from  any  quarter. 

I  repeat — will  any  gentleman  be  kind  enough  to  point  out  a  single  objection 
to  the  new  law,  which  might  not  be  urged  with  equal  propriety  to  the  act 
of  '93  ? 

[Here  a  gentleman  present  rose,  and  called  the  attention  of  Mr.  DOUGLAS  to 
the  penalties  in  the  seventh  section  of  the  new  law,  and  desired  to  know  if 
there  were  any  such  obnoxious  provisions  in  the  old  one.] 

Mr.  DOUGLAS  then  read  the  section  referred  to,  and  also  the  fourth  section 
ol  the  act  of  '93,  and  proceeded  to  draw  the  parallel  between  them.  Each 
makes  it  a  criminal  offence  to  resist  the  due  execution  of  the  law;  to  knowingly 
and  wilfully  obstruct  or  hinder  the  claimant  in  the  arrest  of  the  fugitive;  to 
rescue  such  fugitive  from  the  claimant  when  arrested;  to  harbor  or  conceal 
such  person  after  notice  that  he  or  she  was  a  fugitive  from  labor.  In  this 
respect  the  two  laws  were  substantially  the  same  in  every  important  particular. 
Indeed  the  one  was  almost  a  literal  copy  of  the  other.  I  can  conceive  of  no 
act  which  would  be  an  offence  under  the  one,  that  would  not  be  punishable 
under  the  other.  In  the  speeches  last  night,  great  importance  was  given  to 
the  clause  which  makes  it  an  offence  to  harbor  or  conceal  a  fugitive.  You 
were  told  that  you  could  not  clothe  the  naked,  nor  feed  the  hungry,  nor  exer- 
cise the  ordinary  charities  towards  suffering  humanity,  without  incurring  the 
penalty  of  the  law.  Is  this  a  true  construction  of  that  provision  ?  The  act 
does  not  so  read.  The  law  says  that  you  shall  not  "  harbor  or  conceal  such 
fugitive,  so  as  to  prevent  the  discovery  and  arrest  of  such  person  after  notice  or 
knowledge  of  the  fact  that  such  person  was  a  fugitive  from  service  or  labor  as 
aforesaid."  This  does  not  deprive  you  of  the  privilege  of  extending  charities 
to  the  fugitive.  You  may  feed  him,  clothe  him,  may  lodge  him,  provided  you 
do  not  harbor  or  conceal  him,  so  as  to  prevent  discovery  and  arrest,  after  notice 
or  knowledge  that  he  is  a  fugitive.  The  offence  consists  in  preventing  the  dis- 
covery and  arrest  of  the  fugitive  after  knowledge  of  the  fact,  and  not  in  ex- 
tending kindness  and  charities  to  him.  This  is  the  construction  put  upon  a 
similar  provision  in  the  old  law  by  the  highest  judicial  tribunals  in  the  land. 
The  only  difference  between  the  old  law  and  the  new  one,  in  respect  to  ob- 
structing its  execution,  is  to  be  found  in  the  amount  of  the  penalty,  and  not  in 
the  principle  involved. 

But  it  is  further  objected  that  the  new  law  provides,  in  addition  to  the  penalty 
for  a  civil  suit  for  damages,  to  be  recovered  by  an  action  of  debt  by  any  court 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  cause.  This  is  true;  but  it  is  also  true  that  a  similar 


provision  is  to  be  found  in  the  old  law.     The  concluding  clause  in  the  last  sec- 
tion of  the  act  of  '93  is  as  follows  : 

"  Which  penalty  may  be  recovered  by  and  for  the  benefit  of  such  claimant, 
by  action  of  debt,  in  any  proper  court  to  try  the  same;  saving)  moreover,  to  the 
person  claiming  such  labor  or  service,  his  right  of  action  for  or  on  account 
the  said  injuries,  or  either  of  them." 

Thus  it  will  be  seen,  that  upon  this  point  there  is  no  difference  between  the 
new  and  the  old  law. 

Is  there  any  other  provision  of  this  law  upon  which  explanation  is  desired  ? 

[A  gentleman  present  referred  to  the  10th  section,  and  desired  an  explana- 
tion of  the  object  and  effect  of  the  record  from  another  State  therein  pro- 
vided for.] 

I  am  glad,  said  Mr.  D.,  that  my  attention  has  been  called  to  that  provision; 
for  I  heard  a  construction  given  to  it,  in  the  speeches  last,  night,  entirely  dif- 
ferent to  the  plain  reading  and  object  of  that  section.  It  is  said,  that  this 
provision  authorizes  the  claimant  to  go  before  a  court  of  record  of  the  county 
and  State  where  he  lives,  and  there  establish  by  ex  parte  testimony,  in  the 
absence  of  the  fugitive,  the  facts  of  servitude,  of  ownership,  and  escape;  and 
when  a  record  of  these  facts  shall  have  been  made,  containing  a  minute 
description  of  the  slave,  it  shall  be  conclusive  evidence  against  a  person  cor- 
responding to  that  description,  arrested  in  another  State,  and  shall  consign  the 
person  so  arrested  to  perpetual  servitude.  The  law  contemplates  no  such 
thing,  and  authorizes  no  such  result.  I  have  the  charity  to  believe  that  those 
•  who  have  put  this  construction  upon  it  have  not  carefully  examined  it.  The 
record  from  another  State  predicated  upon  "  satisfactory  proof  to  such  court  or 
judge"  before  whom  the  testimony  may  be  adduced,  and  the  record  made,  is 
to  be  conclusive  of  two  facts  only: 

1st.  That  the  person  named  in  the  record  does  owe  service  to  the  person  in 
whose  behalf  the  record  is  made.  .  '  . 

2d.  That  such  person  has  escaped  from  service. 

The  language  of  the  law  is,  that  "the  transcript  of  the  record  authenticated," 
&c.,  "  shall  be  held  and  taken  to  be  full  and  conclusive  evidence  of  the  fact  of 
escape,  and  that  the  service  or  labor  of  such  person  escaping  is  due  to  the 
party  in  such  record  mentioned."  The  record  is  conclusive  of  these  two 
'^cts,  so  far  as  to  authorize  the  fugitive  to  be  sent  back  for  trial  under  the  laws 
of  the  State  whence,  he  fled;  but  it  is  no  evidence  that  the  person  arrested  here 
is  the  fugitive  named  in  the  record.  The  question  of  identity  is  to  be  proven 
here  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  commissioner  or  judge,  before  whom  the  trial  is 
had,  by  "other  and  further  evidence."  This  is  the  great  point  in  the  case. 
The  whole  question  turns  upon  it.  The  man  arrested  may  correspond  to  the 
description  set  forth  in  the  record,  and  yet  not  be  the  same  individual.  We 


21 

often  meet  persons  resembling  each  other  to  such  an  extent  that  the  one  is 
frequently  mistaken  for  the  other.  The  identity  6f  the  person  becomes  a  mat- 
ter of  proof — a  fact  to  be  established  by  the  testimony  of  competent  and 
disinterested  witnesses,  and  to  be  decided  by  the  tribunal  before  whom  the 
trial  is  had,  conscientiously  and  impartially,  according  to  the  evidence  in  the 
case.  TV.e  description  in  the  record,  unsupported  "by  other  testimony,  is  not 
evidence  of  the  identity.  It  is  not  inserted  for  the  especial  benefit  of  the 
claimant — much  less  to  the  prejudice  of  the  alleged  slave.  It  is  required  as  a  test 
of  truth,  a  safe-guard  against  fraud,  which  will  often  operate  favorably  to  the 
fugitive,  but  never  to  his  injury.  If  the  description  be  accurate  and  true,  no 
injustice  can  possibly  result  from  it.  But  if  it  be  erroneous  or  false,  the 
claimant  is  concluded  by  it;  and  the  fugitive,  availing  himself  of  the  error, 
defeats  the  claim,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  discrepancy  between  the  allega- 
tions and  the  proof,  in  any  other  case,  results  to  the  advantage  of  the  defend- 
ant. I  repeat,  that  when  an  arrest  is  made  under  a  record  from  another  State, 
the  identity  of  the  person  must  be  established  by  competent  testimony.  The 
trial,  in  this  instance,  would  be  precisely  the  same  as  in  the  -case  of  a  white 
man  arrested  on  the  charge  of  being  a  fugitive  from  justice.  The  writ  of  the 
governor,  predicated  upon  an  indictmenf,  or  even  an  affidavit,  from  another 
State,  containing  the  charge  of  crime,  would  be  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
right  to  take  the  fugitive  back;  but  the  identity  of  the  person  in  that  case,  as 
well  as  a  fugitive  from  labor,  must  be  proven  in  the  State  where  the  arrest  is 
made,  by  competent  witnesses,  before  the  tribunal  provided  by  law  for  that 
purpose.  In  this  respect,  therefore,  the  negro  is  placed  upon  a  perfect  equality 
with  the  white  man  who  is  so  unfortunate  as  to  be  charged  with  an  offence  in 
another  State,  whether  the  charge  be  true  or  false.  In  some  respects,  the  law 
guards  the  rights  of  the  negro,  charged  with  being  a  fugitive  from  labor,  more 
rigidly  than  it  does  those  of  a  white  man  who  is  alleged  to  be  a  fugitive  from 
justice.  The  record  from  another  State  must  be  predicated  upon  "  proof  satis- 
factory to  the  court  or  judge"  before  whom  it  is  made,  and  must  set  forth  the 
"matter  proved,"  before  it  can  be  evidence  against  a  fugitive  from  labor,  or  for 
any  purpose;  whereas,  an  innocent  white  man,  who  is  so  unfortunate  as  to  be 
falsely  charged  with  a  crime  in  another  State,  by  the  simple  affidavit  of  an 
unknown  person,  without  indictment,  or  proof  to  the  satisfaction  of  any  court, 
is  liable  to  be  transported  to  the  most  distant  portions  of  this  Union  for  trial. 
Here  we  find  the  act  of  last  session  is  a  great  improvement  upon  the  law  of 
'93  in  refeience  to  fugitives,  white  or  black,  whether  they  fled  from  justice  or 
labor.  But  it  is  objected  that  the  testimony  before  the  court  making  the  record 
isexparte,  and  therefore  in  violation  of  the  principles  of  justice  and  the  Consti- 
tution, because  it  deprives  the  accused  of  the  privilege  of  meeting  the  wit- 
nesses face  to  face,  and  of  cross  examination.  Gentlemen  forget  that  all  pro- 
ceedings for  the  arrest  of  fugitives  are  necessarily  ex  parte,  from  the  nature  of 


23;  « 

the  case.  They  have  fled  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  the  object 
of  the  proceeding  is  that  they  may  be  brought  back,  confront  the  witnesses, 
and  receive  a  fair  trial  according  to  the  constitution  and  laws.  If  they  would 
stay  at  home  in  order  to  attend  the  trial  and  cross  examine  the  witnesses,  the 
record  would  be  unnecessary,  and  the  Fugitive  law  in  operative.  It  is  no  an- 
swer to  this  proposition  to  say  that  slavery  is  no  crime,  and  therefore  the  par- 
allel does  not  hold  good.  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  sla- 
very. I  am  discussing  our  obligations  under  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States.  That  sacred  instrument  says  that  a  fugitive  from  labo-  "shall  be  de- 
livered up  on  the  claim  of  the  owner.  The  same  clause  of  the  same  instrument 
provides  that  fugitives  from  justice  shall  be  delivered  up.  We  are  bound  by 
our  oaths  to  our  God  to  see  that  claim  as  well  as  every  other  provision  of  the  Con- 
stitution carried  into  effect.  The  moral,  religious,  and  constitutional  obligations 
resting  upon  us,  here  and  hereafter,  are  the  same  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 
As  citizens,  owing  allegiance  to  the  Government  and  duties  to  society,  we 
have  no  right  to  interpose  our  individual  opinions  and  scruples  as  excuses  for 
violating  the  supreme  law  of  the  land  as  our  fathers  made  it,  and  as  we  are 
sworn  to  support  it.  The  obligation  is  just  as  sacred,  under  the  Constitution,  to 
surrender  fugitives  from  labor  as  fugitives  from  justice.  And  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  according  to  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court,  are  as  im- 
peratively commanded  to  provide  the  necessary  legislation  for  the  one  as  for 
the  other.  The  act  of  1793,  to  which  I  have  had  occasion  to  refer  so  fre- 
quently, and  which  has  been  read  to  you,  provided  for  these  two  cases  in  the 
same  bill.  The  first  half  of  that  act,  relating  to  fugitives  from  justice,  applies, 
from  the  nature  and  necessity  of  the  case,  principally  to  white  men;  and  the 
other  half,  for  the  same  reasons,  applies  exclusively  to  the  negro  race.  I  have 
shown  you,  by  reading  and  comparing  the  two  laws  in  your  presence,  that 
there  is  no  constitutional  guaranty — or  common  law  right — or  legal,  or  judicial 
privilege — for  the  protection  of  the  white  man  against  oppression  and  injustice, 
under  the  law,  framed  in  1793,  and  now  in  force,  for  the  surrender  of  fugitives 
from  justice,  that  does  not  apply  in  all  its  force  in  behalf  of  the  negro,  when 
arrested  as  a  fugitive  from  labor,  under  the  act  of  the  last  session.  What  more 
can  the  friends  of  the  negro  ask  than,  in  all  his  civil  and  legal  rights  under  the 
Constitution,  he  shall  be  placed  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  white  man?  But 
it  is  said  that  the  law  is  susceptible  of  being  abused  by  perjury  and  false  tes- 
timony. To  what  human  enactment  does  not  the  same  objection  lie?  You,  or 
I,  or  any  other  man,  who  was  never  in  California  in  his  life,  are  liable,  under 
the  constitution,  to  be  sent  there  in  chains  for  trial  as  a  fugitive  from  justice  by 
means  of  perjury  and  fraud.  But  does  this  fact  prove  that  the  Constitution,  and 
the  laws  for  carrying  it  into  effect,  are  wrong,  and  should  be  resisted,  as  we 
were  told  last  night,  even  unto  the  dungeon,  the  gibbet,  and  the  grave?  It 
only  demonstrates  to  us  the  necessity  of  providing  all  the  safeguards,  that  the 


I  23 

«        ^ 

wit  of  man  can  devise,  for  the  protection  of  the  innocent  and  the  free,  at  the 
same  time  that  we  religiously  enforce,  according  to  its  letter  and  spirit,  every 
provision  of  the  Constitution.  I  will  not  say  that  the  act  recently  passed  for 
the  surrender  of  fugitives  from  labor  accomplishes  all  this;  but  I  will  thank 
any  gentleman  to  point  out  any  one  barrier  against  abuse  in  the  old  law,  or  in 
the  law  for  the  surrender  of  white  men,  as  fugitives  from  justice,  that  is  not 
secured  to  the  negro  under  the  new  law.  I  pause  in  order  to  give  any  gentle- 
man an  opportunity  to  point  out  the  provision.  I  invite  inquiry  and  examina- 
tion. My  object  is  to  arrive  at  the  truth — to  repel  error  and  dissipate  preju- 
dice— and  to  avoid  violence  and  bloodshed.  Will  any  gentleman  point  out  the 
provision  in  the  old  law,  for  securing  and  vindicating  the  rights  of  the  free  man, 
that  is  not  secured  to  him  in  the  act  of  last  session? 

[A  gentleman  present  rose  and  called  the  attention  of  Mr.  DOUGLAS  to  the 
provision  for  paying  out  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  the  expenses  of 
carrying  the  fugitive  back  in  case  of  anticipated  resistance.] 

Ah,  said  Mr.  D.,  that  is  a  question  of  dollars  and  cents,  involving  no  othter 
principle  than  the  costs  of  the  proceeding!  I  was  discussing  the  question  of 
human  rights — the  mode  of  protecting  the  rights  of  freemen  from  invasion, 
and  the  obligation  to  surrender  fugitives  under  the  Constitution.  Is  it  possible 
that  this  momentous  question,  which,  only  forty-eight  hours  ago,  was  deemed 
of  sufficient  importance  to  authorize  the  city  council  to  nullify  an  act  of  Con- 
gress, and  raise  the  standard  of  rebellion  against  the  Federal  Government,  has 
dwindled  down  into  a  mere  petty  dispute,  who  shall  pay  the  costs  of  suit? 
This  is  too  grave  a  question  for  me  to  discuss  on  this  occasion.  I  confess  my 
utter  inability  to  do  it  justice.  Yesterday  the  Constitution  of  the  ocean-bound 
Republic  had  been  overthrown;  the  privileges  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
had  been  suspended;  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  had  been  abolished;  pains  and 
penalties  had  been  imposed  upon  every  humane  citizen  who  should  feed  the 
hungry  and  cover  the  naked;  the  law  of  God  had  been  outraged  by  an  infa- 
mous act  of  a  traitorous  Congress;  and  the  standard  of  rebellion,  raised  by  our 
city  fathers,  was  floating  in  the  breeze,  calling  on  all  good  citizens  to  rally 

under  its  sacred  folds,  and  resist  with  fire  and  sword the  payment  of  the 

costs  of  suit  upon  the  arrest  of  a  fugitive  from  labor! 

I  will  pass  over  this  point,  and  inquire  whether  there  is  any  other  provision 
of  this  law  upon  which  an  explanation  is  desired?  I  hope  no  one  will  be  back- 
ward in  propounding  inquiries,  for  I  have  but  a  few  days  to  remain  with  you, 
and  desire  to  make  a  clean  business  of  this  matter  on  the  present  occasion.  Is 
there  any  other  objection? 

[A  gentleman  rose,  and  desired  to  know  why  the  bill  provides  for  paying  ten 
dollars  to  the  commissioner  for  his  fee  in  case  he  decided  in  favor  of  the  claim- 
ant, and  only  five  dollars  if  he  decided  against  him.] 


_. 

I  presume,  said  Mr.  DOUGLAS,  the  reason  was  that  he  would  have  more 
labor  to  perform.  If,  after  hearing  the  testimony,  the  commissioner  decided 
in  favor  of  the  claimant,  the  law  maJe  it  his  duty  to  prepare  and  authenticate 
the  necessary  papers  to  authorize  him  to  carry  the  fugitive  home;  but  if  he 
decided  against  him,  he  had  no  such  labor  to  perform.  The  law  seems  to  be 
based  upon  the  principle  that  the  commissioner  should  be  paid  according  to  the 
service  he  should  render — five  dollars  for  presiding  at  the  trial,  and  five  dollars 
for  making  out  the  papers  in  case  the  testimony  should  require  him  to  return  the 
fugitive.  This  provision  appears  to  be  exciting  considerable  attention  in  the 
country,  and  I  have  been  exceedingly  gratified  at  the  proceedings  of  a  mass 
meeting  held  in  a  county  not  far  distant,  in  which  it  was  resolved  unanimous- 
ly that  they  could  not  be  bribed,  for  the  sum  of  five  dollars,  to  consign  a  free- 
man to  perpetual  bondage!  This  shows  an  exalted  state  of  moral  feeling, 
highly  creditable  to  those  -who  participated  in  the  meeting.  I  doubt  not  they 
will  make  their  influence  felt  throughout  the  State,  and  will  instruct  their 
members  of  the  legislature  to  reform  our  criminal  code  in  this  respect.  Un- 
der our  laws,  as  they  have  stood  for  many  years,  and  probably  from  the  organ- 
ization of  our  State  government,  in  all  criminal  cases,  on  the  preliminary 
examination  before  the  magistrates,  and  in  all  the  higher  courts,  if  the  prisoner 
be  convicted,  the  witnesses,  jurors,  and  officers  are  entitled  to  their  fees  and 
bills  of  costs;  but  if  he  be  acquitted,  none  of  them  receive  a  cent.  In  order  to 
diffuse  the  same  high  moral  sense  throughout  the  whole  community,  would  it 
not  be  well,  at  their  next  meeting,  to  pass  another  resolution,  that  they  would 
not  be  bribed  by  the  fees  and  costs  of  suit  in  any  case,  either  as  witnesses, 
jurors,  magistrates,  or  in  any  other  capacity,  to  consign  an  innocent  man  to  a 
dismal  cell  in  the  penitentiary,  or  expose  him  to  an  ignominious  death  upon 
the  gallows?  Such  a  resolution  might  do  a  great  deal  of  good  in  elevating  the 
character  of  our  people  abroad,  at  the  same  time  that  it  might  inspire  increased 
confidence  in  the  liberality  and  conscientiousness  of  those  who  adopted  it! 

Is  there. any  other  objection  to  this  law? 

[A  gentleman  rose,  and  celled  the  attention  of  Mr.  Douglas  to  the  provision 
vesting  the  appointment  of  the  Commissioners  under  it  in  the  courts  of  law, 
instead  of  the  President  and  Senate,  and  asked  if  that  was  not  a  violation  of 
that  provision  of  the.  Constitution  which  says  that  Judges  of  the  Supreme 
Courts,  and  of  the  inferior  courts,  should  be  appointed  by  the  President  and 
Senate.] 

I  thank  the  gentleman,  said  Mr.  D.,  for  calling  my  attention  to  this  point. 
It  was  made  in  the  speech  of  a  distinguished  lawyer  last  night,  and  evidently  pro- 
duced great  effect  upon  the  minds  of  the  audience.  The  gentleman's  high  pro- 
fessional standing,  taken  in  connexion  with  his  laborious  preparation  for  the 
occasion,  as  was  apparent  to  all,  from  his  lengthy  written  brief  before  him. 


f*  25  ^          . 

while  speaking,  inspired  implicit  confidence  in  the  correctness  of  his  position. 
My  answer  to  the  objection  will  be  found  in  the  Constitution  itself,  which  I 
will  read,  so  far  as  it  bears  upon  this  question  : 

"  The  President  shall  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate, 
shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers,  and  consuls,  Judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United  States,  where  appointments 
are  not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and  which  shall  be  established  by  law." 

Now  it  .will  be  seen  that  the  words  "inferior  courts"  are  not  mentioned  in 
the  Constitution.  The  gentleman  in  his  zeal  against  the  law,  and  his  frenzy 
to  resist  it,  interpolated  these  words,  and  then  made  a  plausible  argument  upon 
them.  I  trust  this  was  all  unintentional,  or  was  done  with  the  view  of  fulfil- 
ling the  "  higher  law."  But  there  is  another  sentence  in  this  same  clause  of 
the  Constitution  which  I  have  not  yet  read.  It  is  as  follows: 

"  But  the  Congress  may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers 
as  they  think  proper  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  Courts  of  Law,  or  in  the 
heads  of  Departments." 

The  practise  under  this  clause  has  usually  been  to  confer  the  power  of  ap- 
pointing those  inferior  officers,  whose  duties  were  executive  or  ministerial,  upon 
the  President  alone,  or  upon  the  head  of  the  appropriate  department ;  and  in 
like  manner  to  give  to  the  courts  of  law  the  privilege  of  appointing  their  sub- 
ordinates, whose  duties  were  in  their  nature  judicial.  What  is  meant  by  "in- 
ferior officers,"  whose  appointment  may  be  vested  in  the  "  courts  of  law," 
will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  8th  section  of  the  Constitution,  where  the 
powers  of  Congress  are  enumerated,  and  among  them  is  the  following  : 

"To  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court." 

Is  the  tribunal  which  is  to  carry  the  fugitive  law  into  effect  inferior  to  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  ?  If  it  is,  the  Constitution  expressly  pro- 
vides for  vesting  the  appointment  in  the  courts  of  law.  I  will  remark,  how- 
ever, that  these  commissioners  are  not  appointed  under  the  new  law,  but  in 
obedience  to  an  act  of  Congress  which  has  stood  on  the  statute  books  for 
many  years.  If  those  who  denounce  and  misrepresent  the  act  of  last  session, 
had  condescended  to  read  it  before  they  undertook  to  enlighten  the  people 
upon  it,  they  would  have  saved  themselves  the  mortification  of  exposure,  as  I 
will  show  by  reading  the  first  section. 

Here  Mr.  DOUGLAS  read  the  law,  and  proceeded  to  remark  :  Thus  it  will  be 
seen  that  these  commissioners  have  been  in  office  for  years,  with  their  duties 
prescribed  by  law,  nearly  all  of  which  were  of  a  judicial  character,  and  that 
the  new  law  only  imposes  additional  duties,  and  authorizes  the  increase  of  the 
number.  Why  has  not  this  grave  constitutional  objection  been  discovered  be- 
fore, and  the  people  informed  how  their  rights  have  been  outraged  in  violation 
of  the  supreme  law  of  the  land  ?  Truly,  the  passage  of  the  Fugitive  bill  has 
thrown  a  flood  of  light  upon  constitutional  principles  ! 


26 

to 

Is  there  any  other  objection  to  the  new  law  which  does  not  apply  to  the  act 
of  '93  ? 

[A  gentleman  rose,  and  said  that  he  would  like  to  ask  another  question, 
which  was  this :  if  the  new  law  was  bo  similar  to  the  old  one,  what  was  the  ne- 
cessity of  passing  any  at  all,  since  the  old  one  was  still  in  force  ?] 

Mr.  DOUGLAS,  in  reply,  said,  that  is  the  very  question  I  was  anxious  some 
one  should  propound,  because  I  was  desirous  of  an  opportunity  of  answering 
it.  The  old  law  answered  all  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  enacted  tolerably 
well,  until  the  decision  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  the  case 
ofPriggs  vs.  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  eight  or  nine  years  ago.  That  deci- 
sion rendered  the  law  comparatively  inoperative,  for  the  reason  that  there  was 
scarcely  any  officers  left  to  execute  it.  It  will  be  recollected  that  the  act  of 
'93  imposed  the  duty  of  carrying  it  into  effect  upon  the  magistrates  and  other 
officers  under  the  State  governments.  These  officers  performed  their  duties 
under  that  law,  with  fidelity,  for  about  fifty  years,  until  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
the  case  alluded  to,  decided  that  they  were  under  no  legal  obligation  to  do  so, 
and  that  Congress  had  no  constitutional  power  to  impose  the  duty  upon  them. 
From  that  time,  many  of  the  officers  refused  to  act,  and  soon  afterwards  the 
legislature  of  Massachusetts,  and  many  other  States,  passed  laws  making  it 
criminal  for  their  officers  to  perform  these  duties.  Hence  the  old  law,  although 
efficient  in  its  provisions,  and  similar  in  most  respects,  and  especially  in  those 
now  objected  to,  almost  identical  with  the  new  law,  became  comparatively  a 
dead  letter  for  want  of  officers  to  carry  it  into  effect.  The  judges  of  the  United 
States  courts  were  the  only  officers  left  who  were  authorized  to  execute  it. 
In  this  State  for  instance,  Judge  Drummond,  whose  residence  was  in  the  ex- 
treme northwest  corner  of  the  State,  within  six  miles  ol  Wisconsin  and  three 
of  Iowa,  and  in  the  direction  where  fugitives  were  least  likely  to  go,  was  the 
only  person  authorized  to  try  the  case. 

If  a  fugitive  was  arrested  at  Shawneetown  or  Alton,  three  or  four  hundred 
miles  from  the  residence  of  the  judge,  the  master  would  attempt  to  take  him 
across  the  river  to  his  home  in  Kentucky  or  Missouri,  without  first  establishing 
his  right  to  do  so.  This  was  calculated  to  excite  uneasiness  and  doubts  in  the 
minds  of  our  citizens,  as  to  the  propriety  of  permitting  the  negro  to  be  carried 
out  of  the  State,  without  the  fact  of  his  owing  service,  and  having  escaped, 
being  first  proved,  iest  it  might  turn  out  that  the  negro  was  a  free  man  and  the 
claimant  a  kidnapper.  And  yet,  according  to  the  express  terms  of  the  old  law, 
the  master  was  authorized  to  seize  his  slave  wherever  he  found  him,  and  to 
carry  him  back  without  process,  or  trial,  or  proof  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 
Hence,  it  was  necessary  to  pass  the  act  of  last  session,  in  order  to  carry  into 
effect,  in  a  peaceable  and  orderly  manner,  the  provisions  of  the  law  and  the 
Constitution  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  protect  the  free  colored  man  from  being 
kidnapped  and  sold  into  slavery  by  unprincipled  men  on  the  other  hand.  The 


27 

purpose  of  the  new  law  is  to  accomplish  these  two  objects — to  appoint  officers 
to  carry  the  law  into  effect,  in  the  place  of  the  magistrates  relieved  from  that 
duty  by  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  to  guard  against  harassing 
and  kidnapping  the  free  blacks,  by  preventing  the  claimant  from  carrying  the 
negro  out  of  the  State,  until  he  establishes  his  legal  right  to  do  so.  The  new 
law,  therefore,  is  a  great  improvement  in  this  respect  upon  the  old  one,  and  is 
more  favorable  to  justice  and  freedom,  and  better  guarded  against  abuse. 

[A  person  present  asked  leave  to  propound  another  question  to  Mr.  DOUGLAS, 
which  was  this:  "If  the  new  law  is  more  favorable  to  freedom  than  the  old 
one,  why  did  the  southern  slaveholders  vote  for  it,  and  desire  its  passage  ?"] 

Mr.  DOUGLAS  said  he  would  answer  that  question  with  a  great  deal  of  pleasure. 
The  southern  members  voted  for  it  for  the  reason  that  it  was  a  better  law  than 
the  old  one — better  for  them,  better  for  us,  and  better  for  the  free  blacks.  It 
places  the  execution  of  the  law  in  the  hands  of  responsible  officers  of  the 
government,  instead  of  leaving  every  man  to  take  the  law  into  his  own  hands 
and  to  execute  it  for  himself.  It  affords,  personal  security  to  the  claimant 
while  arresting  his  servant  and  taking  him  back,  by  providing  him  with  the 
opportunity  of  establishing  his  legal  rights  by  competent  testimony  before  a 
tribunal  duly  authorized  to  try  the  case,  and  thus  allay  all  apprehensions  and 
suspicions,  on  the  part  of  our  citizens,  that  he  is  a  villain,  attempting  to  steal  a 
free  man  for  the  purpose  of  selling  him  into  slavery.  The  slaveholder  has  as 
strong  a  desire  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  free  black  man  as  we  have,  and 
much  more  interest  to  do  so;  for  he  well  knows,  tha,t  if  outrages  should  be  tol- 
erated under  the  law,  and  free  men  are  seized  and  carried  into  slavery;  from 
that  moment  the  indignant  outcry  against  it  would  be  so  strong  here  and  every- 
where, that  even  a  fugitive  from  labor  could  not  be  returned,  lest  he  also  might 
happen  to  be  free.  The  interest  of  the  slaveholder,  therefore,  requires  a  law 
which  shall  protect  the  rights  of  all  free  men,  black  or  white,  from  any  invasion 
or  violation  whatever.  I  ask  the  question,  therefore,  whether  this  law  is  not 
better  than  the  old  one — better  for  the  North  and  the  South — better  for  the 
peace  and  quiet  of  the  whole  country  ?  Let  it  be  remembered  that  this  law  is 
but  an  amendment  to  the  act  of  '93,  and  that  the  old  law  still  remains  in  force, 
except  so  far  as  it  is  modified  by  this.  Every  man  who  voted  against  this 
modification,  thereby  voted  to  leave  the  old  law  in  force;  for  I  am  not  aware 
that  any  member  of  either  House  of  Congress  ever  had  the  hardihood  to  propose 
to  repeal  the  law,  and  make  no  provisions  for  carrying  the  Constitution  into 
effect.  But  the  cry  of  repeal,  as  to  the  new  law,  has  already  gone  forth. 
Well,  suppose  it  succeeds;  what  will  those  have  gained  who  joined  in  the  shout  ? 
Have  I  not  shown  that  all  the  material  objections  they  urge  against  the  new 
law,  apply  with  equal  force  to  the  old  one  ?  What  do  they  gain,  therefore, 
unless  they  propose  to  repeal  the  old  law,  also,  and  make  no  provision  for  per- 
forming our  obligations  under  the  Constitution  ?  This  must  be  the  object  of  all 


28 

men  who  take  that  position.  To  this  it  must  come  in  the  end.  The 
real  objection  is  not  to  the  new  law,  nor  to  the  old  one,  but  to  the  Consti- 
tution itself.  Those  of  you  who  hold  these  opinions,  do  not  mean  that  the 
fugitive  from  labor  shall  be  taken  back.  That  is  the  real  point  of  your  objec- 
tion. You  would  not  care  a  farthing  about  the  new  law,  or  the  old  law,  or  any 
other  law,  or  what  provisions  it  contained,  if  there  was  a  hole  in  it  big  enough 
for  the  fugitive  to  slip  through  and  escape.  Habeas  corpuses — trials  by  jury — 
records  from  other  States — pains  and  penalties — the  whole  catalogue  of  objec- 
tions, would  be  all  moonshine,  if  the  negro  was  not  required  to  go  back  to  his 
master.  Tell  me,  frankly,  is  not  this  the  true  character  of  your  objection  ? 

[Here  several  gentlemen  gave  an  affirmative  answer.] 

Mr.  DOUGLAS  said  he  would  answer  that  objection  by  reading  a  portion  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  He  then  read  as  follows : 

"  No  person  held  to  service  or  labor  in  one  State,  under  the  laws  thereof, 
escaping  into  another,  shall,  in  consequence  of  any  law  or  regulation  therein, 
be  discharged  from  such  service  or  labor,  BUT  SHALL  BE  DELIVERED  UP  on  the 
claim  of  the  party  to  whom  such  service  or  labor  may  be  due." 

This,  said  Mr.  D.,  is  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  speaking  to  every  citizen 
of  the  republic.  The  command  is  imperative.  There  is  no  avoiding — no 
escaping  the  obligation,  so  long  as  we  live  under,  and  claim  the  protection  of, 
the  Constitution.  We  must  yield  implicit  obedience,  or  we  must  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  release  ourselves  from  the  obligation  to  obey.  There  is  no 
other  alternative.  We  must  stand  by  the  Constitution  of  the  Union,  with  all  its 
compromises,  or  we  must  abolish  it,  and  resolve  each  State  back  into  its  original 
elements.  It  is,  therefore,  a  question  of  union  or  disunion.  We  cannot 
expect  our  brethren  of  other  States  to  remain  faithful  to  the  compact,  and  per- 
mit us  to  be  faithless.  Are  we  prepared,  therefore,  to  execute  faithfully  and 
honestly  the  compact  our  fathers  have  made  for  us? 

[Here  a  gentleman  rose,  and  inquired  of  Mr.  DOUGLAS,  whether  the  clause 
in  the  Constitution  providing  for  the  surrender  of  fugitive  slaves  was  not  in 
violation  of  the  law  of  God?] 

Mr;  DOUGLAS  in  reply — The  divine  law  is  appealed  to  as  authority  for  disre- 
garding our  most  sacred  duties  to  society.  The  city  council  have  appealed  to 
it,  as  their  excuse  for  nullifying  an  act  of  Congress;  and  a  committee  embodied 
the  same  principle  in  their  resolutions  to  the  meeting  in  this  hall  last  night,  as 
applicable  both  to  the  Constitution  and  laws.  The  general  proposition  that  there 
is  a  law  paramount  to  all  human  enactments — the  law  of  the  Supreme  Ruler  of 
the  Universe — I  trust  that  no  civilized  and  Christian  people  is  prepared  to 
question,  much  less  deny.  We  should  all  recognise,  respect,  and  revere  the 
divine  law.  But  we  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  law  of  God,  as  revealed  to 
us,  is  intended  to  operate  on  our  consciences,  and  insure  the  performance  of 
our  duties  as  individuals  and  Christians.  The  divine  law  does  not  prescribe 


29 

the  form  of  government  under  which  we  shall  live,  and  the  character  of  our 
political  and  civil  institutions.  Revelation  has  not  furnished  us  with  a  con- 
stitution'— a  code  of  international  law — and  a  system  of  civil  and  municipal 
jurisprudence.  It  has  not  determined  the  right  of  persons  and  property — 
much  less  the  peculiar  privileges  which  shall  be  awarded  to  each  class  of  per- 
sons under  any  particular  form  of  government.  God  has  created  man  in  his 
own  image,  and  endowed  him  with  the  right  of  self-government,  so  soon  as  he 
shall  evince  the  requisite  intelligence,  virtue,  and  .capacity  to  a.ssert  and  enjoy 
the  privilege.  The  history  of  the  world  furnishes  few  examples  where  any 
considerable  portion  of  the  human  race  have  shown  themselves  sufficiently 
enlightened  and  civilized  to  exercise  the  rights  and  enjoy  the  blessings  of  free- 
dom. In  Asia  and  Africa  we  find  nothing  but  ignorance,  superstition,  and 
despotism.  Large  portions  of  Europe  and  America  can  scarcely  lay  claim  to 
civilization  and  Christianity;  and  a  still  smaller  portion  have  demonstrated  their 
capacity  for  self  government.  Is  all  this  contrary  to  the  laws  of  God?  And 
if  so,  who  is  responsible?  The  civilized  world  have  always  held,  that  when 
any  race  of  men  have  shown  themselves  so  degraded,  by  ignorance,  supersti- 
tion, cruelty,  and  barbarism,  as  to  be  utterly  incapable  of  governing  them- 
selves, they  must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  governed  by  others,  by  such 
laws  as  are  deemed  applicable  to  their  condition.  It  is  upon  this  principle 
alone  that  England  justifies  the  form  of  government  she  has  established  in  the 
Indies,  and  for  some  of  her  other  colonies— that  Russia  justifies  herself  in  hold- 
ing her  serfs  as  slaves,  and  selling  them  as  a  part  of  the  land  on  which  they 
live — that  our  Pilgrim  Fathers  justified  themselves  in  reducing  the  negro  and 
Indian  to  servitude,  and  selling  them  as  property — that  we,  in  Illinois  and  most 
of  the  free  States,  justify  ourselves  in  denying  the  negro  and  the  Indian  the 
privilege  of  voting,  and  all  other  political  rights — and  that  many  of  the  States 
of  the  Union  justify  themselves  in  depriving  the  white  man  of  the  right  of  the 
elective  franchise,  unless  he  is  fortunate  enough  to  own  a  certain  amount  of 
property. 

These  things  certainly  violate  the  principle  of  absolute  equality  among  men, 
when  considered  as  component  parts  of  a  political  society  c  •  government,  and 
so  do  many  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  Stages,  as  well  as  the 
several  States  of  the  Union.  In  fact,  no  government  ever  existed  on  earth  in 
which  there  was  a  perfect  equality,  in  all  things,  among  those  composing  it  and 
governed  by  it.  Neither  sacred  nor  profane  history  furnishes  an  example.  If 
inequality  in  the  form  and  principles  of  government  is  therefore  to  be  deemed 
a  violation  of  the  laws  of  God,  and  punishable  as  such,  who  is  to  escape? 
Under  this  principle  all  Christendom  is  doomed,  and  no  Pagan  can  hope  for 
mercy!  Many  of  these  things  are,  in  my  opinion,  unwise  aud  unjust,  and,  of 
course,  subversive  of  Republican  principles;  but  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that 
they  are  either  sanctioned  or  condemned  bv  the  divine  law.  Who  can  assert 


30 

that  God  has  prescribed  the  form  and  principles  of  government,  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  political,  municipal,  and  domestic  institutions  of  men  on  earth? 
This  doctrine  would  annihilate  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which  our 
political  system  rests.  Our  forefathers  held  that  the  people  had  an  inherent 
right  to  establish  such  Constitution  and  laws  for  the  government  of  themselves 
and  their  posterity,  as  they  should  deem  best  calculated  to  insure  the  protec- 
tion of  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness;  and  that  the  same  might  be 
altered  and  changed  as  experience  should  satisfy  them  to  be  necessary  and 
proper.  Upon  this  principle  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  was  formed, 
and  our  glorious  Union  established.  All  acts  of  Congress  passed  in  pursuance 
of  the  Constitution  are  declared  to  be  the  supreme  laws  of  the  land,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  is  charged  with  expounding  the  same. 
All  officers  and  magistrates,  under  the  Federal  and  State  Governments — execu- 
tive, legislative,  judicial,  and  ministerial — are  required  to  take  an  oath  to  sup- 
port the  Constitution,  before  they  can  enter  upon  the  performance  of  their 
respective  duties.  Any  citizen,  therefore,  who,  in  his  conscience,  believes 
that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  in  violation  of  a  "higher  law," 
has  no  right,  as  an  honest  man,  to  take  office  under  it,  or  exercise  any  other 
function  of  citizenship  conferred  by  it.  Every  person  born  under  the  Consti- 
tution owes  allegiance  to  it;  and  every  naturalized  citizen  takes  an  oath  to 
support  it.  Fidelity  to  the  Constitution  is  the  only  passport  to  the  enjoyment 
of  rights  under  it.  When  a  Senator  elect  presents  his  credentials,  he  is  not 
allowed  to  take  his  seat  until  he  places  his  hand  upon  the  holy  evangelist, 
and  appeals  to  his  God  for  the  sincerity  of  his  vow  to  support  the  Constitution. 
He,  who  does  this,  with  a  mental  reservation  or  secret  intention  to  disregard 
any  provision  of  the  Constitution,  commits  a  double  crime — is  morally  guilty 
of  perfidy  to  his  God  and  treason  to  his  country! 

If  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  repudiated  upon  the  ground 
that  it  is  repugnant  to  the  divine  law,  where  are  the  friends  of  freedom  and 
Christianity  to  look  for  another  and  a  better?  Who  is  to  be  the  prophet  to 
reveal  the  will  of  God  and  establish  a  Theocracy  for  us? 

Is  he  to  be  found  in  the  ranks  of  northern  abolitionism,  or  of  southern  dis- 
union; or  is  the  common  council  of  the  city  of  Chicago  to  have  the  distinguish- 
ed honor  of  furnishing  the  chosen  one?  I  will  not  venture  to  inquire  what  are 
to  be  the  form  and  principles  of  the  new  government,  or  to  whom  is  to  be  in- 
trusted the  execution  of  its  sacred  functions;  for,  when  we  decide  that  the 
wisdom  of  our  revolutionary  fathers  was  foolishness,  and  their  piety  wicked- 
ness, and  destroy  the  only  system  of  self  government  that  has  ever  realized 
the  hopes  of  the  friends  of  freedom,  and  commanded  the  respect  of  mankind, 
it  becomes  us  to  wait  patiently  until  the  purposes  of  the  Latter  Day  Saints 
.shall  be  revealed  unto  us. 

For  my  part,  I  am  prepared  tc  maintain  and  preserve  inviolate  the  Con- 


31 

stitution  as  it  is  with  all  its  compromises,  to  stand  or  fall  by  the  American 
Union,  clinging  with  the  tenacity  of  life  to  all  its  glorious  memories  of  the 
past  and  precious  hopes  of  the  future. 

Mr.  Douglas  then  explained  the  circumstances  which  rendered  his  absence 
unavoidable  when  the  vote  was  taken  on  the  Fugitive  bill  in  the  Senate.  He 
wished  to  avoid  no  responsibility  on  account  of  that  absence,  and  therefore  de- 
sired it  to  be  distinctly  understood  that  he  should  have  voted  for  the  bill  if  he  could 
have  been  present.  He  referred  to  several  of  our  most  prominent  and  respect- 
ed citizens  by  name,  as  personally  cognizant  of  the  fact  that  he  was  anxious 
at  that  time  to  give  that  vote.  He  believed  the  passage  of  that  or  some  other 
efficient  law  a  solemn  duty,  imperatively  demanded  by  the  Constitution.  In 
conclusion,  Mr.  D.  made  an  earnest  appeal  to  our  citizens  to  rally  as  one  man 
to  the  defence  of  the  Constitution  and  laws,  and  above  all  things,  and  under 
all  circumstances,  to  put  down  violence  and  disorder,  by  maintaining  the  supre- 
macy of  the  laws.  He  referred  to  our  high  character  for  law  and  order  here- 
tofore, and  also  to  the  favorable  position  of  our  city  for  commanding  the  trade 
between  the  North  and  South,  through  our  canals  and  railroads,  to  show  that 
our  views  and  principles  of  action  should  be  broad,  liberal,  and  national,  cal- 
culated to  encourage  union  and  harmony,  instead  of  disunion  and  sectional 
bitterness.  He  concluded  by  remarking,  that  he  considered  this  question  of 
fidelity  to  the  Constitution  and  supremacy  of  the  laws,  as  so  far  paramount  to  all 
other  considerations,  that  he  had  prepared  some  resolutions  to  cover  these 
points  only,  which  he  would  submit  to  the  meeting,  and  take  their  judgment 
upon  them.  If  he  had  consulted  his  own  feelings  and  views  only,  he  should 
have  embraced  in  the  resolutions  a  specific  approval  of  all  the  measures  of  the 
compromise;  but  as  the  question  of  rebellion  and  resistance  to  the  Federal  Go- 
vernment has  been  distinctly  presented,  it  has  been  thought  advisable  to  meet 
that  issue  on  this  occasion,  distinct  and  separate  from  all  others. 

Mr.  Douglas  then  offered  the  following  resolutions,  which  were  adopted  with- 
out a  dissenting  voice : 

Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sacred  duty  of  every  friend  of  the  Union  to  maintain,  and  preserve 
inviolate,  every  provision  of  our  Federal  Constitution. 

Resolved,  That  any  law  enacted  by  Congress,  in  pursuance  of  the  Constitution,  should  be 
respected  as  such  by  all  good  and  law-abiding  citizens;  and  should  be  faithfully  carried  into 
effect  by  the  officers  charged  with  its  execution. 

Resolved,  That  so  long  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides,  that  a  11  persons  held 
to  service  or  labor  in  one  State,  escaping  into  another  State,  "SHALL  BE  DELIVERED  UP  on  the 
claim  of  the  party  to  whom  the  service  or  labor  may  be  due,"  and  so  long  as  members  of  Con- 
gress are  required  to  take  an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution,  it  is  their  solemn  and  religious 
duty  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  to  carry  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  into  effect. 

Resolved,  That  if  we  desire  to  preserve  the  Union,  and  render  our  great  Republic  inseperable 
and  perpetual,  we  must  perform  all  our  obligations  under  the  Constitution,  at  the  same  time  that 
we  call  upon  our  brethren  in  other  States  to  yield  implicit  obedience  to  it. 

Resolved,  That  as  the  lives,  property,  and  safety  of  ourselves  and  our  families  depend  upon 
the  observance  and  protection  of  the  laws,  every  effort  to  excite  any  portion  of  our  population 
to  make  resistance  to  the  due  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  land,  should  be  promptly  and  em- 
phatically condemned  by  every  good  citizen. 


Resolved,  That  we  will  stand  or  fall  by  the  American  Union  and  its  Constitution,  with  all  its 
•compromises,  with  its  gloifofl^  memories  of  the  past  an  f  precious  hopes  of  the  future. 

[The  following  was  ofiered  in  addition  by  B.  S.  Morris,  and  also  adopted :] 

Resolved,  That  we,  the  people  of  Chicago,  repudiate  the  resolutions,  passed  by  the  common 
council  of  Chicago,  upon  the  subject  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  law  passed  by  Congress  at  its  last 
session. 

On  the  succeeding  night  the  common  council  of  the  city  repealed  their  nulli- 
fying resolution  by  a  vote  of  12  to  1. 


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